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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper reviews international evidence on consumer decision-making in 
retail financial markets. Specifically, we identify and evaluate research from 
multiple disciplines and methods that links specific features of products to 
the quality of consumer decisions. The notion of product ‘features’ is 
broadly defined to include not only product attributes, but also emergent 
properties such as product complexity and the salience of information 
disclosure. We document areas of concern from a consumer protection 
perspective, and describe some common themes, including the inability of 
consumers to consider all important attributes and whether they can easily 
discern how the provider is making its profit. We conclude that there is a 
case for closer integration of empirical evidence and financial regulation.      
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Summary 
• Behavioural economics and behavioural finance have brought into 
economic analysis a richer psychological perspective on how individuals 
make financial decisions. 
• Theory suggests firms may have an economic incentive to exploit or 
confuse consumers who display behavioural phenomena such as 
overconfidence or inattention. 
• Evidence suggests full disclosure of information is unlikely to be a 
sufficient remedy, as transparency does not eradicate consumer 
mistakes. 
• Specific errors are systematically related to the context in which they are 
made. Therefore, whoever determines the decision-making context, or 
‘choice architecture’, can influence the outcome of decisions. 
• This review is international in scope; it locates, describes and evaluates 
evidence that specific financial product features have negative effects on 
financial decision-making.  
• Product ‘feature’ is broadly defined, encompassing not only specific 
attributes of the product, such as whether it has a variable rate or a 
capital guarantee, but also emergent properties of the product and how 
the product category presents itself to the consumer. 
• The review covers three broad areas. The first is credit products: 
specifically, credit cards, personal loans and mortgages. The second is 
investment products: specifically, retail investments and structured 
investments. The third area is insurance, with an emphasis on add-on 
insurance and the excess-premium trade-off in types of insurance such 
as car and health insurance. 
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Credit Products 
• Credit-card repayments are strongly influenced by the minimum 
repayment amount suggested by lenders. These amounts act as an 
anchor on consumers’ decisions over how much to repay, possibly 
because they are perceived as a form of advice. 
• Credit-card use is affected by changes to credit limits. Even customers 
whose balances are not close to their credit limit tend to increase 
borrowing in response to increases in their credit limits. There is evidence 
that younger and less-educated individuals change their spending more 
in response to changes in credit limits. 
• Many credit-card fees are not incurred consciously by consumers. An 
analysis of outcomes after the enactment of the US Credit Card 
Accountability Responsibility and Disclosure (CARD) Act (2009) (which 
banned many of these fees) suggests that these fees were essentially 
‘hidden’ from consumers and designed to increase profits. Banning the 
fees has been of substantial benefit to consumers.   
• Consumers’ understanding of personal loan repayment dynamics is 
inaccurate. Superficial aspects of loan offerings have a large bearing on 
decisions. Moreover, when choosing between loans of different 
duration, decisions are influenced by whether monthly repayment or 
financial cost (i.e. the total cost of credit) is emphasised.  
• Consumers do not consider the Annual Percentage Rate (APR) on a loan 
as equivalent to price on a product; they are more sensitive to interest 
rates when the cost is expressed in cash terms. 
• Comprehension of mortgages is often lacking in ways that leave 
consumers exposed to unexpected repayment increases. Low rates of 
refinancing suggest that mortgage knowledge may not improve 
substantially post-purchase. 
• Consumers focus disproportionately on initial repayment costs of 
mortgages. As a result, introductory ‘teaser’ rates often attract 
consumers for whom they are unsuitable. 
• In an experimental setting, decision fatigue associated with choosing a 
house simultaneously with a mortgage causes participants to opt for 
higher-risk mortgages. 
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Investment Products 
• Retail investment consumers pay insufficient attention to fees and too 
much attention to past performance, especially when it is presented 
graphically. 
• The level of fees that firms charge decreases as fee transparency 
requirements increase. 
• Simplifying how fees are displayed and adding graphical warnings to 
beware of high fees improve consumer decisions in an experimental 
setting, without detracting from the attention given to performance. 
• Structured products are complex products. The capital protection 
feature appeals to consumers who are loss-averse. Overly optimistic 
consumers often give disproportionate decision weight to the best 
possible return scenario. 
• In experimental settings, structured products are overvalued, and the 
risk of capital loss is fundamentally misevaluated, resulting in systematic 
underestimation of risk by consumers. 
 
Insurance Products 
• Selling add-on insurance at point-of-sale inhibits deliberative decision-
making and causes emotional and situational factors to play a greater 
role in consumer choices. 
• Consumers can feel pressured into buying add-on insurance at point-of-
sale, or agree to the purchase due to decision fatigue. 
• Even minor barriers to viewing alternative add-on insurance products 
reduce the likelihood of choosing the cheapest option. 
• Consumers struggle to understand the trade-off between premium and 
level of excess, resulting in choices of inferior options from menus. 
Simplification of plan descriptions can improve decision-making in this 
domain. 
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AT-A-GLANCE SUMMARY TABLES OF PRODUCT FEATURES LINKED TO SPECIFIC BEHAVIOURAL 
EFFECTS AND POTENTIAL HARMS  
CREDIT PRODUCTS 
Feature1 Behavioural Effect Potential Harm Possible Preventive Measures 
Minimum or example 
repayment amount 
Anchoring – repayment 
amounts drawn 
towards displayed 
amount 
Credit paid off at a sub-
optimal rate, resulting 
in higher interest costs 
Avoid example 
repayments; provide 
reminder that 
consumer can pay off 
entire balance 
Raised credit limit 
Proportional thinking – 
consumer induced to 
increase borrowing 
Consumer may spend 
more than they can 
afford to repay if 
increased borrowing 
not linked to income or 
affordability 
Determine credit limit 
increases by objective 
risk assessment or 
increased ability to 
repay 
Non-salient fees 
Inattention / limited 
cognitive capacity –
consumer fails to factor 
fee into decision 
Consumer incurs one or 
more fees that they 
were unaware of and 
were hence not 
anticipated 
Make all relevant fees 
salient and simple; limit 
number of fees; cap 
fees   
Relative salience of 
repayments and 
financial cost (cost of 
credit) 
Focusing – consumer 
places too much 
relative weight on the 
more salient attribute  
Consumer opts for 
longer-than-necessary 
loan, incurring higher 
financial cost of 
borrowing 
Ensure disclosures give 
equal prominence to 
co-determined features  
Low introductory 
(‘teaser’) rates 
Focusing; present bias – 
consumer places too 
much weight on lower 
immediate payments 
relative to higher future 
payments 
Consumer takes on too 
much risk and struggles 
to afford repayments 
when introductory rate 
ends 
Include appropriate 
rationale for lower 
initial rate in suitability 
check; make reset rate 
equally salient 
Timing of sale 
Decision fatigue –
consumer’s cognitive 
capacity already taxed 
by thinking about major 
purchase 
Consumer makes 
poorer credit decision 
when choosing after or 
alongside major 
purchase  
Ensure time between 
decisions; avoid 
relevant situational 
factors (e.g. mortgage 
brokers on property 
development sites)  
 
 
  
                                                        
1  Product ‘feature’ is broadly defined, encompassing not only specific attributes of the product, such as whether it has a 
variable rate or a capital guarantee, but also emergent properties of the product and how the product category 
presents itself to the consumer (see Section 2, p.11-12). 
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INVESTMENT PRODUCTS 
Feature Behavioural Effect Potential Harm Possible Preventive Measures 
Non-salient fees 
Inattention / limited 
cognitive capacity –
consumer fails to factor 
fee into decision 
By not integrating fees 
into decision, consumer 
chooses fund with 
lower-than-expected 
returns  
Make all relevant fees 
salient and simple; limit 
number of fees; cap 
fees   
Framing of fees 
Proportional thinking – 
consumer dismisses or 
underweights 
percentage differences 
that are small relative 
to investment amount 
By underweighting fees 
in decision, consumer 
fails to choose funds 
with lower fees but 
similar prospects 
Frame fees in monetary 
units (where possible) 
to indicate monetary 
equivalent; cap fees 
Past performance 
Extrapolation bias – 
consumer places too 
much weight on past 
fund growth 
Consumer places too 
much weight on past 
performance relative to 
other important 
attributes, e.g. fees, risk  
Standardise time frame 
for past performance 
information; give risk 
and fees equal 
prominence 
Capital guarantee 
Loss aversion – 
consumer pays 
substantial cost to avoid 
exposure to possibility 
of nominal loss 
Consumer overpays for 
nominal protection, by 
sacrificing expected 
return or incurring 
higher fees  
Cap expected profit 
margins (mark-up 
relative to expected 
returns) of structured 
products 
Headline rate 
Over-optimism; 
probability 
misweighting – 
consumer 
overestimates 
likelihood of best 
outcome 
Consumer misjudges 
expected return relative 
to costs or other 
investments  
Match prominence of 
return scenarios for 
structured products to 
expected likelihood of 
occurrence 
Barrier feature triggers 
capital loss 
Attribute averaging – 
consumer estimates risk 
by averaging across 
multiple funds, 
although only the worst 
performer triggers 
losses 
Consumer takes on 
more risk than intended 
by underestimating risk 
of capital losses when 
choosing between 
funds  
Avoid complex triggers; 
employ ‘what if?’ 
scenarios to gauge 
understanding and 
suitability 
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INSURANCE PRODUCTS 
Feature Behavioural Effect Potential Harm Possible Preventive 
Measures 
Point-of-sale (POS) 
selling 
Decision fatigue – 
consumer’s cognitive 
capacity already taxed 
by purchase decision 
Consumer fails to shop 
around and purchases 
expensive or low-quality 
insurance product 
Ensure separation 
between purchase and 
insurance decision; 
require later 
confirmation of decision 
POS selling Proportional coding – 
consumer judges price 
of insurance relative to 
product price 
Consumer is insensitive 
to price differences 
between equivalent 
insurance products  
Ensure separation 
between purchase and 
insurance decision; 
require later 
confirmation of decision 
POS selling Obligation to reciprocate 
– consumer feels 
obligation given time 
devoted to overall 
transaction by 
salesperson   
Consumer fails to shop 
around and purchases 
expensive or low-quality 
insurance product 
Ensure separation 
between purchase and 
insurance decision; 
require later 
confirmation of decision 
Excess-premium trade-
off 
Cognitive limit on 
information integration 
– consumer overweights 
excess relative to 
premium 
Consumer purchases 
insurance with excessive 
premium to avoid 
unlikely requirement to 
pay an excess  
Employ worked 
examples; use more 
intuitive description for 
excess 
 
 
Introduction 
 
 
1 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
In recent years there has been an accumulation of evidence and growing 
understanding that consumers frequently depart from the self-interested 
utility-maximising models of traditional microeconomics. Behavioural 
economics and behavioural finance have brought into economic analysis a 
richer psychological perspective on how individuals make financial 
decisions. Much of this work has been based on the incorporation of 
methods from experimental psychology, particularly the use of controlled 
experiments, including laboratory, online, survey and field experiments. 
These complement more traditional empirical tools used for economic and 
financial analysis, such as economic modelling and the econometric analysis 
of administrative and survey data. Used well, experiments allow different 
research questions to be addressed and causal influences on behaviour to 
be more precisely identified. The result of these scientific innovations is a 
rapidly expanding literature that documents many systematic influences on 
economic financial decision-making. Recent comprehensive overviews of 
relevant work can be found, from the perspective of behavioural economics 
and finance, in Baddeley (2013), and, from the perspective of economic 
psychology, in Ranyard (2018).  
Broadly speaking, empirical results in behavioural economics and finance 
reveal that consumers sometimes, perhaps often, make errors in their 
decision-making. Furthermore, evidence suggests that specific errors are 
systematically related to the context in which they are made. The 
implication is that whoever determines the decision-making context, or 
“choice architecture” (Thaler and Sunstein, 2008), can influence the 
outcome of decisions – for better or for worse. Unsurprisingly, therefore, 
these scientific advances raise multiple public policy issues (e.g. Shafir, 
2013), among which consumer protection features prominently (Miklitz et 
al., 2011). Such concerns are often expressed specifically in relation to retail 
financial products (Barr, Mullainathan and Shafir, 2008; Barr-Gill and 
Warren, 2008; Mak and Braspenning, 2012), for which the concern is 
arguably amplified. The decisions involved are often among the most 
significant economic decisions that households make and, consequently, 
have potentially large implications for wellbeing. 
These concerns would be less troubling if the market offered its own 
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solutions, such as by incentivising providers to help consumers to 
understand their products and make sound financial decisions. Alas, 
adaptations of orthodox microeconomic models to include the possibility 
that consumers depart from optimal decision-making do not offer comfort. 
Rather, profit-maximising providers may have an economic incentive to 
exploit or confuse consumers where the latter fail to incorporate all relevant 
product information by ‘shrouding’ attributes (Gabaix and Laibson, 2006) or 
struggle to comprehend complex price structures (Carlin, 2009; Grubb, 
2015), with competition likely to exacerbate rather than diminish these 
undesirable incentives. Increasing complexity makes it more difficult for 
consumers to comprehend the structure of the product and, perhaps 
crucially, the means by which the provider makes its profit. Furthermore, it 
is important to understand that such problems are likely to persist even 
where regulations demand full disclosure of information; although an 
important principle, transparency does not eradicate consumer mistakes 
(Loewenstein, Sunstein and Golman, 2014). Challenges to good financial 
decision-making take on multiple forms.  
The current paper is an international literature review that aims to locate, 
describe and evaluate evidence that specific financial product features, 
broadly defined, have negative effects on financial decision-making. Its 
purpose is to ease the difficulty for policymakers and researchers of keeping 
track of the multitude of empirical findings and their implications, which 
span disciplinary boundaries and are expanding at a rapid rate.  
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 defines the key terms and 
scope of the review – what is included and what is not. Section 3 begins the 
main body of the work by reviewing credit products on a product-by-
product basis, with a separate subsection for each major category. Section 
4 deals with investment products in the same way and Section 5 with 
insurance products. Section 6 summarises the findings, describes some 
commonalities across different product categories, and discusses some of 
the implications for policy.  
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2. METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH 
2.1 SCOPE OF THE REVIEW 
The focus of the review is the most common retail financial products that 
account for the main business-to-consumer transactions and fall under the 
remit of general consumer financial regulation. Specifically, we cover 
evidence in relation to six broad categories: credit cards, personal loans, 
mortgages, non-structured retail investment products, structured 
investment products and insurance. The review does not consider the 
potential impacts of changing interfaces between providers and customers, 
such as price comparison websites, online calculators, mobile banking apps, 
online financial trading, or other innovations often described under the 
label ‘fintech’. Nor does it cover products that are typically sold under 
bespoke regulatory or legislative regimes, such as pension products.   
2.2 SOURCING MATERIAL 
One challenge in compiling this review was the variety of source material. 
We initially attempted a systematic and documented approach, with lists of 
keywords to be exhaustively searched against a finite list of research 
databases and specific titles. The volume and variety of relevant material 
turned out to greatly exceed initial expectations, however, with the result 
that this approach was unworkable. An additional complication was the 
different nomenclature used across jurisdictions to describe the same 
product or product feature. To supplement the systematic search that we 
began, search-engine algorithms were used to uncover similar articles to 
those cited (e.g. Mendeley sends lists of recent articles on topics one 
expresses an interest in). Where a relevant paper was located, we searched 
papers that had cited it, in order to source other studies that addressed the 
same topic. Multiple disciplines and methods are represented. Some high-
quality research covered is ‘grey literature’ – that is, publications that lie 
outside the system of peer-reviewed academic papers, including in-house 
dissemination platforms of regulatory bodies and international 
organisations. A large proportion of studies are recent, which means that at 
the time of writing many papers that demand to be included are in working 
paper form and still going through peer-review and more formal 
publication.  
Given the above, while we have done our best to locate all relevant studies, 
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there is no guarantee that we have done so. Fortunately, however, the aim 
of the present exercise is to identify phenomena rather than to estimate 
effect sizes or assess the balance of evidence for and against a position. 
Thus, it is more likely that we have missed a relevant phenomenon than that 
the phenomena we identify are not soundly established. Nevertheless, as 
with all reviews as distinct from more formal meta-analyses, the priority 
accorded to specific studies is largely a matter of subjective judgment on 
the part of the authors.     
2.3 WHAT CONSTITUTES A PRODUCT ‘FEATURE’? 
The primary criterion for inclusion in this review is whether the study seeks 
to associate one or more features of financial products with the quality of 
consumer decision-making. We define the notion of a product ‘feature’ 
broadly, to encompass not only specific attributes of the product, such as 
whether it has a variable rate or a capital guarantee, but also emergent 
properties of the product and how the product category presents itself to 
the consumer. Thus, where a product contains many attributes, perhaps 
increasing the likelihood that a key attribute is ignored by the consumer, the 
resulting complexity counts as a feature of the product. Where a product is 
sold with certain attributes made explicit and others less so (for instance, 
where the financial cost of a loan is less salient than the monthly 
repayments), the difference in salience is considered to be a product 
feature. Where a disclosure presents key product information, such as past 
performance or a benchmark repayment rate, this disclosure also 
constitutes a product feature. However, we draw a distinction between 
disclosures and provider-specific marketing claims, which we do not count 
as features of products. For instance, a marketing claim by a credit provider 
that they offer ‘the lowest variable rates’ would not be considered a product 
feature; an interest rate discounted for 12 months would. The logic here is 
that, when a type of disclosure is common across competing offerings 
within the market, such that it is an essential or common aspect of 
consumers’ experience of the category of product, it constitutes a feature 
of the product.  
2.4 ASSESSING DECISION-MAKING QUALITY 
The main body of the review concentrates on studies that associate features 
of the product, as just defined, with the quality of consumer decision-
making. Different studies use different criteria to make inferences about 
              Methodological  approach  
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whether decisions are good or bad. Some of the most widely used are as 
follows: 
• Consistency. When a product feature leads to inconsistent decisions, it 
is reasonable to infer that consumers are struggling to make decisions 
that match their real needs or preferences. In contrast, where decisions 
are consistent, it is more likely that the consumer understands the 
product on offer.  
• Choosing ‘dominated’ products.  When product A is as good as product 
B on all attributes but better on at least one, choosing product B is an 
objectively bad decision because it is ‘dominated’ by product A. In other 
words, there is no set of preferences that can justify choosing product B 
over product A. Evidence of consumers choosing dominated products 
suggests that the product in question is not well understood or that 
consumers are unable to integrate the attribute information accurately.  
• Knowledge or comprehension. Where consumers cannot correctly 
answer questions about a product that are relevant to their financial 
outcomes, researchers infer that the decision to purchase it is more likely 
to be unsound.  
• Decisions not aligning with theoretical predictions. Researchers can 
compare observed behaviour with what theoretical models predict 
behaviour should look like (i.e. with the output of normative models). 
Sometimes it can be argued that no reasonable logic matches the 
observed decision, implying that a factor that should be unimportant is 
influencing decisions.  
For each of these criteria for assessing the quality of consumers’ decisions, 
it may be possible to generate counterexamples or to find arguments that 
rationalise or justify consumers’ choices. For instance, consistency is not a 
bulletproof measure of good decision making because it is possible to make 
consistently bad decisions. Rather than beginning with an assumption that 
some of these criteria are better or more persuasive than others, 
throughout the review, we assess the weight of evidence on a case-by-case 
basis.  
2.5 BROADER EVIDENCE LINKING FEATURES WITH BEHAVIOURS 
In addition to describing studies that explicitly test for a link between the 
quality of decision-making and features of each financial product, we also 
highlight studies that link the product category with a specific behavioural 
phenomenon in general. For instance, with respect to credit cards, we 
describe evidence that some consumers struggle to control their spending 
and appear not to understand the repayment dynamics of credit cards in 
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general. This type of evidence, while not directly addressing the issue at the 
heart of the review, nevertheless provides an important empirical backdrop 
for interpreting those studies that do. Similarly, there are relevant studies 
that demonstrate links between certain financial product features and 
particular subsets of consumers, with implications for the quality of 
decision-making. These too are important to include, because a product 
feature may attract consumers for whom the product is not financially 
suitable. Where providers are meant to sell financial products only to those 
for whom they are suitable, product features that potentially undermine 
this aim are important to identify. For instance, mortgages with low 
introductory interest rates are suitable for consumers who expect an 
income increase in the near future and wish to engage in consumption 
smoothing. Yet this feature may also attract present-biased consumers with 
no expected income growth, for whom they are unsuitable.  
2.6 TRIANGULATION OF METHODS 
We avoid being prescriptive about methods, where again we adopt a case-
by-case basis approach. Whether evidence should be considered stronger if 
it arises from laboratory experiments, surveys, mass transaction data or 
field studies is not only a matter of subjective scientific judgment, but also 
depends on what research question is being addressed. Nevertheless, we 
do point out instances where the triangulation of multiple methods points 
to the same conclusion. In our view, this generally strengthens the inference 
that can be made about the validity of the finding. However, this argument 
is not an absolute. In some cases we also highlight single studies that are 
highly persuasive; for instance, because of the high quality of the data or 
robustness of the study design.  
We intentionally do not provide sample sizes for every study reviewed. 
Sample size alone is rarely indicative of the quality of a study or the strength 
of the inference that can be drawn from its results. This is especially true 
when a review covers multiple methods, such as surveys and laboratory 
experiments, which differ in their ability to identify causal effects from a 
given sample size. However, we provide sample sizes for particular studies 
where we have judged this information relevant in assessing its contribution 
to knowledge. 
Lastly, with regard to our approach, where possible we have aimed to 
indicate not only the statistical significance or otherwise of empirical results, 
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but also associated effect sizes. This is particularly important in any area 
where a negative impact on consumers must be weighed up against the 
costs associated with a practice or regulation designed to alleviate it.  
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3. CREDIT PRODUCTS 
 
From a psychological perspective, credit cards, loans and mortgages share 
some commonalities. All involve the need to balance immediate desires 
against future payments. All require consumers to come to grips with the 
nonlinear relationships that underlie the compounding of interest and the 
paying down of debt over time. Kamleitner, Hoelzl and Kirchler (2012) 
provide a detailed review from a psychological perspective. Common to 
these credit products seems to be difficulty in estimating how long it takes 
to pay off debt and the associated cost (Ranyard and Craig, 1993; Overton 
and MacFadyen, 1998; Yard, 2004; McHugh, Ranyard and Lewis, 2011; Soll, 
Keeney and Larrick, 2013). Nevertheless, each of these credit products has 
its own idiosyncrasies. Credit cards are a dynamic and transactional form of 
debt, potentially involving multiple overlapping spending and repayment 
decisions on a monthly basis. Mortgages are associated with spending on a 
specific product and constitute a much larger and longer form of credit than 
personal loans. Despite some commonalities, therefore, in the present 
review we consider these financial products separately and in turn. 
3.1 CREDIT CARDS 
Five Key points 
• Many consumers do not repay credit card debt in a way that minimises 
the cost of credit. Higher interest balances are not paid off earlier. Low-
yield savings and high-interest credit-card debt are often held 
simultaneously. 
• Credit-card repayments are strongly influenced by the minimum 
repayment amount suggested by lenders. These amounts act as an 
anchor on consumers’ decisions regarding how much to repay, possibly 
because they are perceived as a form of advice. 
• Worked examples involving higher repayment amounts can also act as 
anchors, both pulling up low repayments and simultaneously pulling 
down higher ones, with the potential to reduce payments on average. 
• Credit-card use is affected by changes to credit limits. Even customers 
whose balances are not close to their credit limit tend to increase 
borrowing in response to increases in their credit limits. Younger and 
less-educated individuals change their spending more in response to 
changes in credit limits. 
• Many credit-card fees are not incurred consciously by consumers. An 
analysis of outcomes after the enactment of the US Credit Card 
Accountability Responsibility and Disclosure (CARD) Act (2009) (which 
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banned many of these fees) suggests these fees were essentially ‘hidden’ 
from consumers and designed to increase profits. Banning the fees has 
been of substantial benefit to consumers.   
Introduction 
Credit cards are one of the most ubiquitous consumer financial products. 
The majority of households in developed countries possesses at least one 
credit card (e.g. Schuh and Stavins, 2015). Credit cards provide more than 
credit. They offer a convenient and documented payment method, facilitate 
online purchase, are required by some firms for deposit or guarantee 
purposes, can make it easier to return goods, and reduce the need to carry 
cash. Credit cards, therefore, confer clear consumer benefits.  
The first section describes background, non-feature evidence that provides 
context for the subsequent feature-specific evidence.  How consumer 
decision-making is affected by suggested repayments amounts, credit limits 
and hidden fees will then be discussed in turn.  
There is evidence that some consumers struggle to control spending with 
credit cards and that many do not comprehend the dynamics of debt 
repayment. This evidence, although based predominantly on US customers, 
serves as useful background for considering the role of specific features of 
credit-card offerings. 
With respect to spending, people will spend more on credit cards than they 
will in cash in the same situation (Feinberg, 1986; Prelec and Simester, 
2001), implying that deferring payment increases willingness to spend. 
Controlling for background characteristics and credit constraints, Meier and 
Sprenger (2010) found that individual customers who were biased towards 
immediate rather than delayed rewards in behavioural experiments also 
had higher credit-card debt and a higher probability of rolling over their 
debt. The study found that debts of these “present biased” individuals were, 
on average, approximately $500 higher than those of non-biased 
individuals. The response of customers to changes in their terms also 
indicates potential difficulties in controlling spending; for instance, where 
borrowing responds more to interest-rate reductions than to equivalent 
increases (Gross and Souleles, 2002).  
Spending on credit cards generates the need for repayments. Many 
consumers appear not to understand the associated repayment dynamics. 
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Most straightforwardly, consumers underestimate the interest rate charged 
on their card. Based on survey data, Frank (2011) found the average 
underestimate among US consumers to be approximately one-third, with 
higher underestimation among consumers more inclined to optimism about 
future economic indicators and personal longevity. Patterns of repayment 
across products appear to involve following dominated strategies. For 
instance, some consumers hold significant levels of interest-bearing debt 
simultaneously with low-yielding assets that could be used to pay off some 
of the debt (Gross and Souleles, 2002). Similarly, based on data from a large 
sample of UK accounts, holders of multiple cards pay off debt in proportion 
to balances rather than paying off the card with the higher interest rate first 
(Gathergood et al., 2017). Similarly, Ponce et al. (2017) found that Mexican 
credit-card consumers with multiple cards did not allocate spending to 
lower-interest cards and increased spending in response to introductory 
rate offers, but did not also reallocate debt between cards to reflect the new 
rate. In an online scenario experiment in which US consumers made 
hypothetical decisions over multiple credit cards, Besharat, Carrillat and 
Ladik (2014) found that participants were inclined to pay off debt on smaller 
balances despite interest-rate differences.  
Consumers do not seem to perceive the impact of interest accurately. In 
another online experiment, Soll, Keeney and Larrick (2013) found that 
almost 90 per cent of a sample of US consumers underestimated the time it 
would take to pay off a credit-card debt at a constant low repayment rate, 
while over 40 per cent failed to realise that paying off less than the interest 
would cause the balance to increase. In a large experiment conducted at a 
US bank, 40 per cent of around 150,000 consumers failed to choose the (ex-
post) cost-minimising option when choosing between two cards, one of 
which had a lower annual fee, the other a lower interest rate (Agarwal et 
al., 2015a). 
These findings provide the backdrop when considering studies on specific 
product features. Given that many consumers, first, struggle with self-
control in relation to spending on credit cards and, second, are uncertain of 
consequences in relation to associated repayment, they may be susceptible 
to product features that exacerbate self-control problems or that direct 
consumers towards specific repayment options. 
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Anchoring on Minimum Repayments 
Anchoring effects refer to the tendency of decision-makers to be influenced 
by arbitrary or irrelevant numbers (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974), or 
‘anchors’. Two potential anchors are discussed in the section: (i) minimum 
repayments – this is set by the credit-card provider; (ii) the CARD Act three-
year repayment – the CARD Act stipulates that, in addition to the minimum 
repayment, bills must show the repayment amount to pay off the bill in full 
in three years. We review multiple studies that use different methods to 
show how repayments on credit cards are influenced by these suggested or 
example repayments displayed on bills. The impact on the quality of 
decision-making is proxied by the degree to which disclosing a potential 
repayment amount lowers repayments. While in any one case it is not 
possible to say whether a given repayment is disadvantageous for the 
consumer, where the presence or absence of the anchor produces 
inconsistent repayments, the implication is disadvantageous decision-
making. Furthermore, where a disclosure generates repayments that are 
lower than they would otherwise have been, the implication is that 
consumers roll over more debt and pay more in interest payments, with 
likely negative consequences.    
In a mixed-method study, Stewart (2009) first showed that, among a sample 
of 248 UK credit-card users, repayments (measured as a proportion of the 
balance) and minimum repayments had a significant correlation of 0.57. The 
study then deployed an experiment with 413 participants who received a 
hypothetical credit-card bill and were asked to decide how much they would 
repay. The presence or absence of a minimum repayment was manipulated 
between subjects. Participants who received a bill with no minimum 
repayment opted to repay an average of 70 per cent more. The real and 
experimental data were in close accord. These experimental results have 
since been closely replicated by Navarro-Martinez et al. (2011) in an online 
experiment with US consumers. In a follow-up experiment conducted 
online, 481 US consumers were randomised to receive one of seven credit-
card statements, which varied in minimum repayment, as well as 
combinations of disclosures of interest costs, time to pay off the debt at 
minimum repayment levels, and the level required to pay off the debt in 
three years. The presence of a minimum repayment again had a consistent, 
negative and significant effect on repayments, although no significant 
difference was recorded between minimum repayments of 2 per cent and 
5 per cent of the balance. All other disclosures tested had no discernible 
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impact. Navarro-Martinez et al. also analysed data for UK accounts from 
multiple providers over a period of 21 months, amounting to more than half 
a million credit-card statements and associated payments. Higher minimum 
repayments were linked to higher repayments for most consumers among 
providers who had a single minimum repayment policy. The reverse 
relationship was recorded among providers with multiple policies, who 
appeared to be segmenting customers by demanding higher monthly 
payments from riskier customers. Taken together, these two multi-method 
studies provide good evidence that a minimum repayment acts as an anchor 
that lowers repayment levels.  
In addition to these investigations specific to minimum repayments, several 
studies have focused on provisions in the US CARD Act. It requires that bills 
use an example table to make explicit both how long it will take to pay off 
the debt at the minimum repayment rate, together with the total cost, and 
how much would need to be repaid each month to pay it off in three years 
(provided this is greater than the minimum repayment), again together with 
the total cost. Hershfield and Roese (2015) hypothesised that disclosing 
both rates might result in even lower repayments than just disclosing the 
minimum repayment, especially as consumers who would otherwise repay 
more might be drawn towards the ‘middle option’ of the three-year 
amount. This hypothesis was tested in multiple studies conducted online. In 
an initial study referring to the consumer’s most recent bill, those shown 
both rates paid off a lower proportion of their balance, especially if they 
recalled paying attention to the example table. However, under the Act, 
disclosure of the three-year amount is confounded with higher balances and 
interest rates. Thus, follow-up experiments employed hypothetical 
statements and repayment choices to manipulate disclosures 
independently. Chosen repayment rates were lower among those given 
both disclosures, with the modal payment moving towards the three-year 
payoff amount. Participants also tended to describe this as an ‘appropriate’ 
amount to pay, suggesting that it was a normative cue. These findings with 
respect to a third disclosure of a repayment rate, in addition to the 
minimum repayment and full balance, raise the issue that any example 
repayment has the capacity both to pull up low repayments and 
simultaneously to pull down higher ones, with the potential to reduce 
payments on average. In keeping with this interpretation, Salisbury (2014) 
reports two online hypothetical experiments with US consumers in which 
disclosure of the three-year amount both decreased the proportion paying 
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more and increased the proportion paying less, with little overall effect.  
Given the above evidence that the three-year rate disclosure failed to raise 
repayments, McHugh and Ranyard (2016) tested two higher repayment 
anchors in an online hypothetical experiment with a mixed student/public 
sample in the UK. A first experiment disclosed the amount required to pay 
off the balance in two years (to match Australian regulations), for a range of 
balances from £435 to £10,000. While minimum payment anchoring was 
again replicated across the range of balances, disclosure of the two-year 
anchor backfired: instead of increasing average repayments, it  reduced 
them. A second experiment instead tested a nine-month anchor (i.e. a 
suggested repayment of 12 per cent of the balance), which did increase 
mean repayments. The authors note that this result differed from a 
condition tested in Hershfield and Roese (2015) in which a higher anchor of 
40 per cent of the balance generated no effect, but suggest this may be due 
to that study using a much lower balance. In their second experiment, 
McHugh and Ranyard used the average UK balance of £990 and two higher 
amounts. Thus, while all studies point to significant anchoring effects, in 
which individual consumers choose to repay at lower or higher rates than 
they otherwise would, the overall effects of specific anchor rates may vary 
by level of balance, market and perhaps other factors, but are perhaps best 
estimated by mass transaction data. 
Evidence from Mass Transaction Data 
Given the extent of variation in behaviour across consumers, the direction 
of aggregate effects may depend on the composition of small samples. Thus, 
experimental approaches are better at demonstrating the existence of 
anchoring phenomena than at estimating their overall effects. Mass 
transaction data are superior for this purpose. In the specific context of the 
CARD Act, Agarwal et al. (2015b) exploited access to a large volume of 
account data for the eight largest US banks, covering 160 million credit-card 
accounts from January 2008 to December 2012. These data showed that the 
proportion of customers paying the three-year rate increased by a small 
amount, but suggested no overall change in repayments from the three-
year rate disclosure, indicating that the new disclosure acted as an anchor 
that dragged repayments both up and down. Similarly, Keys and Wang 
(2016) used large-scale data from the Consumer Financial Protection 
Bureau (CFPB) to analyse 40 million observations between 2008 and 2013, 
testing for changes in repayments when a provider’s minimum repayment 
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formula changed. The data revealed bunching of payments close to the 
minimum, despite changes in the minimum repayment, suggesting an 
influence of anchoring rather than liquidity constraints. The study estimated 
a lower bound of at least 10 per cent of consumer accounts anchored to the 
minimum rate and a smaller proportion to the three-year payment rate, 
which was adopted by less than 1 per cent. Thus, while consistent with the 
direction of experimental results, mass transaction data suggest a smaller 
effect of a third anchor than implied by experimental studies. These findings 
are more substantially at odds with those of Jones, Loibl and Tennyson 
(2015), who recorded an increase in repayments following the introduction 
of the CARD Act. However, this last study was based on self-report data from 
a repeated monthly cross-sectional telephone survey of just 300–500 
households. Much greater evidential weight must be given to the findings 
based on mass transaction data.  
Credit Limit Effects 
There is evidence from multiple methods that credit use is affected by 
changes to credit limits. Gross and Souleles (2002), using data for 24,000 US 
accounts tracked over 24 months, found that even customers whose 
balances were not close to their credit limit tended to increase borrowing 
in response to increases in their credit limits. The marginal propensity to 
consume was estimated at 10–14 per cent; in other words, a €1 increase in 
a credit limit resulted in a €0.10–€0.14 increase in credit use. However, this 
effect was smaller among customers further from their limit. Soman and 
Cheema (2002) investigated the same effect in a series of experiments and 
via survey data. In their hypothetical choice experiments, higher credit limits 
induced higher spending.   
One possibility is that this finding is related to consumers’ struggles to rein 
in spending on credit cards; the limit increase attracts attention, generates 
temptation, or signals norms regarding reasonable debt levels. Like a 
minimum or recommended repayment, it may simply act as an anchor. 
However, that credit use increases with credit limits does not necessarily 
imply that some consumers are making poor decisions. As Gross and 
Souleles (2002) discuss in detail, consumers may sensibly hold balances at a 
level that provides a precautionary buffer of liquidity, so that an increase in 
the limit leads them quite reasonably to use more credit to smooth 
consumption and manage financial risk. However, Soman and Cheema 
(2002) independently manipulated credit limits and total individual liquidity 
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within a hypothetical experiment, finding that spending decisions were 
driven by the credit limit, not by liquidity. Additional experiments and 
survey data suggested that the credit limit was being interpreted as a signal 
of likely future earnings. To the extent that credit limits are, in reality, linked 
to future earnings, this, again, is not an unreasonable inference for 
consumers to make, but it does potentially mean that providers can 
manipulate levels of credit-card spending through alterations in credit 
limits. In this context, it is notable that Soman and Cheema (2002) found in 
two separate surveys that the influence of credit limits on credit-card 
spending was greater among younger and less-educated respondents.  
It is not clear to what extent this association between credit limits and credit 
use has implications for situations where regulations prevent providers 
from increasing limits unless in response to consumer requests, such as in 
Ireland. Presumably, any indication from a provider that they would be 
willing to grant an increase carries a similar signal to an increase itself, but 
in general such regulations are likely to reduce both the ability of providers 
to exploit any behavioural impact of higher credit limits and the incidence 
of limit increases generally. 
‘Hidden’ Fees 
Consumers who take out new credit cards incur higher rates of fees than 
existing customers. One study estimated that fee expenditure in the US 
market fell by 75 per cent over the first three years of an account (Agarwal 
et al., 2008). Many of these fees were not salient to consumers; for example, 
were described only in the small print. Combined with the evidence that 
these fees often do not feature in consumers’ decision-making until they 
are incurred, they can in this sense be considered ‘hidden’ – a term which 
does not necessarily imply that fees are deliberately concealed, only that 
from the consumer’s perspective they are absent from view when it 
matters. As described in section 3.1.2, the study of Agarwal et al. (2015b) 
found small effects associated with the disclosure of the three-year 
repayment rate introduced by the CARD Act, but recorded much more 
substantial effects associated with new regulations to limit fees. They tested 
the combined effect of the following provisions of the Act:  
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(1) Banning fees for breaking credit limits unless the consumer opted in to an 
agreement to honour limit-busting transactions and pay a fee 
 
(2) Capping late fees and over-limit fees 
 
(3) Permitting only one fee per violation in any billing period 
 
(4) Banning non-use fees 
 
(5) Limiting rate increases linked to borrower behaviour 
 
(6) Giving earlier notifications of interest-rate changes and other account 
information 
Treating the Act’s introduction as a natural experiment, Agarwal et al. 
compared consumers’ use and cost of borrowing on credit cards against the 
same outcomes for small business cards not subject to the regulations. The 
results revealed a reduction in borrowing costs equivalent to an annualised 
1.6 per cent of the average balance, rising to over 5 per cent for consumers 
with low credit scores. There was no indication of changes to interest rates, 
debt levels or income from other fees that would suggest that providers 
recouped the lost revenue via other means. Overall, the average saving to 
US consumers was estimated at $12 billion per year. Given the provisions in 
the Act, the implication is that consumers were previously unaware of, paid 
insufficient attention to, or were excessively optimistic about avoiding fees.  
Ru and Schoar (2016) used a different approach to generate further 
evidence that consumers struggle to factor in fees.  They analysed panel 
data recording receipt of direct marketing material by a sample of US 
households. Cards offered to consumers with lower educational attainment 
tended to have back-loaded fee structures (e.g. higher late or over-limit 
fees, bigger difference between initial interest rate and final rate), whereas 
those offered to consumers with higher levels of educational attainment 
tended to have upfront fees (e.g. annual flat fee). Whether fees were front- 
or back-loaded was also linked to reward programmes likely to appeal to 
different market segments. The use of back-loaded fees and teaser rates 
increased in response to state-level increases in unemployment insurance, 
which reduced credit risk. In other words, with greater unemployment 
insurance coverage, consumers would be more likely able to pay these fees 
in the event of job loss. The clear implication of these marketing techniques 
is that less sophisticated consumers could be attracted to cards with back-
Credit products 
 
 
17 
loaded fees and lower initial rates.  
CFPB research, using a dataset that included nearly 85 per cent of all credit 
cards in the US, revealed similar differences in responses to changes in APR 
and hidden late payment fees by prime and subprime consumers 
(Alexandrov et al., 2018). Low-risk (prime) cardholders, who are generally 
considered more sophisticated users of credit, were more sensitive to 
changes in late payment fees than higher-risk (subprime) cardholders, who 
often had lower socioeconomic status and lower educational attainment. 
Prime users decreased balances as both APR and late fees increased, and 
vice versa. Subprime users, however, actually decreased balances as late 
fees decreased. This is an anomaly under the rational consumer model, but 
according to the authors is in line with theories of limited attention 
(Mullainathan and Shafir, 2013) for consumers under financial strain. When 
unable to process all relevant information, consumers employ a rule-of-
thumb to avoid the worst outcome, such as paying off a certain amount 
every month to avoid high late fees. Mullainathan and Shafir (2013) 
postulate that reductions in late fees caused attention to shift to interest-
rate charges. The year after the price cap imposed on late fees by the CARD 
Act, subprime users were more sensitive to APR. The reduction in balances 
given a decrease in fees was 25 per cent larger in low-income US counties 
where financial stress was more likely. 
Corroborating evidence of attentional constraints of credit-card consumers 
comes from a randomised controlled trial in Brazil (Medina, 2017). This 
study was conducted in conjunction with a personal finance platform. The 
intervention group received smartphone reminders to make a credit-card 
repayment to avoid late fees; the control group did not. The treatment was 
successful in its narrow goal of reducing late fee costs, but many incurred 
higher bank overdraft fees instead. The novel aspect of this study is that it 
is the first to document trade-offs when influencing consumers with 
informational ‘nudges’. Previous work (e.g. Chetty et al., 2014 on saving 
behaviour) documents no detrimental side-effects of nudges. 
The evidence of cognitive and attentional constraints tallies with the survey 
evidence of Lusardi and Tufano (2015), who found that respondents with 
lower levels of ‘debt literacy’, measured by answers to objective 
comprehension questions, were more likely to incur fees for paying late, 
breaking limits, using cash advances and paying only minimum repayments. 
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These authors estimated that one-third of charges and fees paid by those 
with low debt literacy were attributable to lack of knowledge.     
Experimental research by the CFPB and the World Bank provides further 
evidence that fees go unnoticed unless regulation mandates ensure they are 
salient to consumers (Carpenter et al., 2017). This task concerned the choice 
of a prepaid card, which is different to a credit card (because the money has 
to be loaded onto the account first) but has many design features in 
common, particularly in terms of fee structure. This laboratory experiment 
was a pre-test of a CFPB intervention to bring in simplified shot-form 
disclosure for prepaid cards.  
Participants had to choose between the following three prepaid cards, 
which were randomly assigned the labels A, B and C in the task: 
•  ‘Default card’ – its fees were selected from ranges typical of the market 
 
•  ‘Dominated card’ – similar to the default but worse on one attribute 
 
•  ‘Best card’ – designed to be optimal for the individual based on 
preferences obtained at an earlier experimental session 
Participants were randomly allocated to one of three groups: 
• Control condition: Fee disclosure was stated in the ‘fine print’ as was the 
market norm at the time 
 
• CFPB disclosure: Fee information printed in a tabular format that 
facilitated comparison 
 
• Enhanced disclosure: Required arithmetic printed to make comparison 
easier for consumers 
Results showed that, in the control condition, the majority did not choose 
the best card, and 20 per cent chose the dominated card. The improvement 
in the CFPB treatment was minor. In the enhanced disclosure condition, 
there was a statistically significant reduction in the proportion choosing the 
dominated card relative to the two other groups, but no pronounced 
movement towards choosing the best card. The authors infer that simplified 
disclosures reduce the likelihood of consumers making an obvious error; 
that is, choosing the dominated option.  
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Credit-Card Summary  
Consumers struggle both to control spending on credit cards and to 
comprehend the dynamics of repayment of credit-card debt. Against this 
backdrop, there is strong and converging evidence from multiple methods 
that minimum repayments on bills act as anchors, lowering repayments and 
hence increasing levels of debt and associated costs. A conservative 
estimate of the lower bound is that this phenomenon affects 10 per cent of 
credit-card customers. The figure could be substantially higher. Disclosures 
of additional potential repayment levels, such as those mandated by the US 
CARD Act, also act as anchors, increasing the repayments of some 
consumers who would otherwise repay less, while decreasing the 
repayments of some who would pay more. Experimental effect sizes 
associated with this latter effect are larger than effects recorded in 
transaction data.  
As well as minimum or example repayments, there is evidence that credit 
limits alter levels of spending on credit cards even when individuals are not 
credit-constrained. Evidence from multiple methods suggests that this is 
because the credit limit is treated as a signal about future earning potential, 
with greater impact on the young and less educated. The volume of 
evidence is, nevertheless, lower than for minimum payment anchoring. 
Further investigation of these effects would be useful.     
There is also evidence that consumers incur fees that they are either 
unaware of, pay insufficient attention to, or are too optimistic about 
avoiding. By placing regulatory restrictions on fees, the CARD Act has been 
of substantial benefit to consumers.        
These findings offer challenges to policymakers aiming to assist the financial 
decision-making of consumers. Notification of the minimum repayment 
seems only reasonable where there is a fee for failing to make it, but 
disclosure of higher repayments has largely ambiguous effects. One 
potentially useful finding that may warrant further study is that a disclosure 
simply reminding the consumer that they could pay right up to the full 
balance increased repayments (Hershfield and Roese, 2015). However, 
there may be limits to what can be achieved via disclosure. A recent trial of 
multiple forms of written disclosures mailed to 160,000 indebted customers 
in Mexico recorded nil or only marginal impacts (Seira, Elizondo and Laguna-
Müggenburg, 2017). Additional challenges (or perhaps opportunities) for 
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both policy and research surround the fact that increasing numbers of 
credit-card customers do not receive a paper bill, but instead engage with 
their accounts only electronically.    
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3.2 PERSONAL LOANS 
Five Key Points 
• Consumers’ intuitions for loan repayment dynamics are inaccurate. 
Repayment time, given principal, APR and monthly repayment, is often 
underestimated, but financial cost, given other loan attributes, is 
overestimated. 
• Superficial aspects of loan offerings – such as the first figure of the 
monthly repayment, or even the picture on the loan advertisement – 
influence consumer decisions. 
• When choosing between loans of different duration, consumer decisions 
are influenced by whether monthly repayment or total financial cost is 
given greater prominence. When the latter is emphasised, consumers 
choose shorter loans, and vice versa. 
• Consumers do not consider APR on a loan as equivalent to price on a 
product.  
• Consumers are more sensitive to interest rates when the cost is 
expressed in cash terms. Describing the cost of a payday loan in cash 
terms reduced borrowing.  
Introduction 
A personal loan is perhaps the most straightforward form of credit, in that 
the principal, repayment and term are typically decided at the point of 
initiation of the loan. Once the principal, APR and term of a loan are set, the 
monthly repayments and financial cost (or cost of credit) are co-
determined. Nevertheless, there is evidence that the essential relationships 
are challenging for many consumers. Here we first describe background 
literature on how consumers struggle to comprehend the structure of loans. 
Subsequent feature-specific sections discuss evidence on: (i) how variation 
in loan attribute presentation alters decisions and (ii) the impact of high-
cost loan warnings. 
Background Evidence 
Multiple studies have provided participants with a subset of loan attributes 
and then elicited judgments of the co-determined attributes. The findings 
reveal systematic biases in consumers’ intuitions. When asked to estimate 
how long it would take to pay off a loan with a given principal, monthly 
repayment and APR, experimental participants tended to produce 
underestimates (Ranyard and Craig, 1993; Overton and MacFadyen, 1998; 
Yard, 2004). Yet, given a principal and APR, estimates for the financial cost 
of one- or two-year loans were systematically too high (McHugh, Ranyard 
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and Lewis, 2011), seemingly because participants failed to account for the 
paying-down of the principal.  
Based on these inconsistencies and qualitative evidence, Ranyard and Craig 
(1995) argued that consumers have two distinct mental representations of 
loans and that they tend to make judgments and decisions based on one or 
the other. First, they might represent the loan within a budgeting period, 
usually a month, in which they compare the repayments with their monthly 
income and the benefit derived from whatever the money was spent on. 
Second, they might represent the loan across its total duration, comparing 
the amount borrowed (and spent) against the total repaid. Following 
Thaler’s (1985) notion of mental accounting, the argument is that 
consumers will struggle to consider these relationships simultaneously and 
instead view a loan one way or the other, perhaps even flipping between 
the two kinds of representation.  
A corollary of this theory is that a loan challenges consumers’ cognitive 
capacity,  that it has too many aspects for all to be considered 
simultaneously when making a decision. This perspective is consistent with 
other experimental findings. Consumers struggle to weight different price 
components of a loan equally in cash terms (Hermann and Wricke, 1998) 
and are influenced by superficial aspects of attributes, including the first 
digit of the monthly repayment amount (Wonder, Wilhelm and Fewings, 
2008) and whether repayments fall just below round numbers (Estelami, 
2001). In a randomised controlled trial involving 53,000 households in South 
Africa, Bertrand et al. (2010) showed that superficial aspects of a direct 
mailshot, including the number of example loans, whether a particular use 
for the loan was shown, and whether it contained a photo of an attractive 
woman, could alter demand by the equivalent of one-quarter of the interest 
rate. 
These studies provide useful background for considering how the features 
of loans might influence the quality of decisions. If consumers have difficulty 
comprehending the main relationships between key attributes and taking 
all aspects of offerings into account, then decision-making may be affected 
by which subsets of the attributes are made explicit and the saliency or 
otherwise of the primary price component, namely the interest rate. 
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Explicit Presentation of Loan Attributes 
The four key features of a personal loan are: (i) APR; (ii) Term; (iii) Monthly 
Repayment and (iv) Total Financial Cost (or, equivalently, the cost of credit). 
While all of these features are likely to be listed in documentation provided 
to consumers when they take out a loan, marketing material and disclosure 
at the point of decision vary greatly by provider with regard to which 
attributes are explicit and receive emphasis. Given this variation, laboratory 
and survey experiments have been employed to investigate its potential 
impact. The typical design records hypothetical consumer decisions while 
varying which of the co-determined attributes of a loan are made explicit at 
the point of decision. The ability to make consistent decisions across 
identical products when product features are explicit and non-explicit is 
used as an indicator of the quality of decision-making. Typically, choices are 
biased in ways that suggest the explicit attributes are given greater weight 
than co-determined non-explicit attributes. Ranyard et al. (2006) first 
demonstrated with a sample of 28 consumers that strong choice 
inconsistencies could be generated between pairs of loans of different APR 
and different length according to whether the financial cost information was 
explicit. Disclosing financial cost information at the point of decision 
increased the probability of opting for the shorter of two loans. In a larger 
study involving 241 account holders with a UK high street bank, McHugh et 
al. (2011) obtained responses to a survey experiment which required 
participants to imagine taking a loan for £7,500. Each respondent was 
shown the same nine pairs of loans. Each pair had a shorter and a longer 
loan, with the shorter loan possessing a higher repayment but lower 
financial cost, while either loan might have lower APR. The study 
manipulated whether both APR and financial cost were provided in addition 
to the term and monthly repayment. For some of the nine pairs, but not all, 
there were again inconsistencies in consumers’ decisions, with financial cost 
information leading consumers to choose shorter loans.  
One difficulty in interpreting these results is that decisions seem to be 
affected by the specific pairs of loans chosen, making assessment of the 
cause and size of the effect difficult. Lunn, Bohacek and Rybicki (2016) 
conducted a larger within-subject laboratory experiment in which 
participants made multiple binary decisions between loans under four 
different conditions: only term and APR explicit, monthly repayment also 
explicit, financial cost also explicit, all four explicit. APR differences were 
selected randomly from a range, loan terms varied systematically from one 
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to eight years, and the pairs differed in term by one or two years. All four 
conditions produced different patterns of choices, with the greatest 
divergence for loans under five years, which as a simple matter of 
mathematics is where the nonlinearity in the relationship between the term 
and monthly repayments is strongest. Relative to the base condition, 
consumers chose longer loans when the monthly repayment was explicit 
and shorter loans when the financial cost was explicit. The large majority of 
participants displayed this inconsistency. The effect of explicit financial cost 
information was greater when terms were separated by two years, 
suggesting that relative comparisons of cash differences had a particularly 
strong impact on choices. For loans of less than three years, more than one-
quarter of binary decisions could be reversed by altering which of these co-
determined attributes was explicit at the point of decision. In a follow-up 
experiment, providing consumers with an initial table designed to 
demonstrate the non-linearity of the term-monthly repayment relationship 
reduced but did not eliminate the effect.   
These experimental studies provide evidence that the explicit presentation 
of a subset of the co-determined attributes may have a large effect on 
choices of personal loan. The evidence is derived from hypothetical choice 
experiments only, conducted in the laboratory and via surveys, but the 
effect size is substantial. Field evidence in relation to this effect in the 
market would clearly be very helpful.   
Understanding Interest Rates: APR vs. Cash Cost 
One consistent concern in relation to personal loans is whether consumers 
truly understand how much they are paying in order to borrow. A number 
of the findings above imply that consumers do not view the APR on a loan 
as they might the price of a normal consumer good, since, when the relevant 
cash amounts (monthly payment and financial cost) are disclosed, 
additional weight is given to these amounts in decisions and choices are 
altered. Yard (2004) used a laboratory experiment to demonstrate that 
many people intuitively rank loans by cash cost rather than APR. This may 
help to explain why many consumers are willing to take short-term loans at 
very high interest rates. So-called payday loans often come with an APR 
more than ten times higher than the prevailing credit-card rate. 
Bertrand and Morse (2011) investigated whether different kinds of price 
disclosures would reduce borrowing, in a randomised controlled trial (RCT) 
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undertaken with the cooperation of one of the largest payday lenders in the 
United States. All customers who entered 77 stores in 11 states over a two-
week period were invited to participate in the research, and 21 per cent 
agreed to do so. They were randomised to receive disclosures on the 
envelope in which their cash was dispensed. One treatment listed the APR 
of the loan alongside a typical car loan, credit card or subprime mortgage 
(thereby highlighting that it was more than ten times greater than for these 
other forms of credit). The second treatment made explicit the cash cost of 
borrowing relative to a credit card. The third displayed a graphic showing 
the distribution, as a number of people out of ten, who renew payday loans 
over different periods. All treatments reduced the amount borrowed 
relative to a control condition. The cash comparison with a credit card 
produced the largest decline (11 per cent) in the proportion of customers 
who borrowed in the months following the intervention, with a larger effect 
for less educated borrowers and those with higher self-control (self-
reported). The implication of this study is that borrowers did not fully 
appreciate the cost of borrowing until an intervention made it more explicit.  
When these findings are considered alongside those in the previous 
subsection, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that a substantial 
proportion of consumers do not properly grasp what credit is costing them. 
The APR is not treated as the equivalent of a price, until an intervention 
forces an explicit comparison. A straightforward further demonstration of 
this is that the addition of a simple warning message when an APR is high 
relative to the rest of the market is sufficient to significantly alter choices 
(Lunn et al., 2016).  
Personal Loans Summary  
Personal loans generally represent a more static and straightforward form 
of borrowing than a credit card, for which multiple purchases and 
overlapping billing periods can make repayment dynamics more 
complicated. Nevertheless, the above studies imply that consumers are 
unable to make consistent decisions about loans. This is not caused by noise 
in the decision-making process, but instead results from systematic biases 
associated with how the attributes of loans are presented. When the cash 
cost of the loan is somehow made salient or explicit, it increases the 
likelihood of choosing a lower-cost option, including borrowing less or not 
at all in the payday loans study of Bertrand and Morse (2011) when the cash 
cost was compared to other credit products. 
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The empirical findings are arguably consistent with Ranyard and Craig’s 
(1995) dual process account, but perhaps the central broader message is 
that many, perhaps most consumers, are not able to conceive of this 
financial transaction in the round; that is, with a clear idea of what they pay 
in return for what they receive. Thus, the evidence suggests that they are 
more influenced by the attributes that are immediately salient and less by 
co-determined attributes that are not. Furthermore, consumers are not 
sensitive to the interest rate as the primary determinant of value, unless 
prompted to be so. 
Compared with empirical evidence in relation to features of credit cards, 
however, the evidence in relation to personal loans reviewed above does 
not involve such a broad mix of methods. In part, this reflects the richness 
of credit-card data and possibilities for tracking multiple decisions on 
individual accounts. Yet more field studies linking features of personal loans 
to financial choices and behaviour would help to confirm and extend the 
above findings and to give better estimates of the associated effect sizes.  
For policymakers, the challenge may be to find the most beneficial way to 
regulate the presentation of information about personal loans, given that 
consumers struggle to take into account all relevant perspectives.    
3.3 MORTGAGES 
Five Key Points 
• Comprehension of mortgage details is often lacking in ways that leave 
consumers open to unexpected charges – for example, unawareness of 
early repayment charges or of how often interest rates could change. 
• Low rates of refinancing across countries suggest mortgage knowledge 
does not improve post-purchase. 
• Disproportionate weight is given to the initial monthly repayment of a 
mortgage. 
• Teaser introductory rates on mortgages often attract consumers for 
whom they are unsuitable products. Advertising patterns suggest such 
consumers are directly targeted by suppliers of teaser-rate mortgages. 
• In an experimental setting, decision fatigue caused participants to 
choose higher-risk mortgages. 
Introduction 
Mortgages are typically distinct from other credit products with respect to 
the size of the principal and duration of the loan, as well as the fact that the 
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consumer’s decision is often taken coincidentally with the decision to buy a 
house. For most households, mortgage choice is probably the largest and 
most complex financial decision they will make. Mortgages constitute the 
majority of consumer debt (Tufano, 2009). Product features that exploit 
behavioural biases in this market may therefore have the potential to 
generate considerable consumer detriment.  
Qualitative investigations and survey responses reveal that consumers have 
a poor understanding of mortgage details (Lacko and Pappalardo, 2010) and 
tend to give “overwhelming weight to initial monthly repayments” (Miles, 
2004, p.6), suggesting scope for product features designed to exploit 
behavioural phenomena (Bar-Gill, 2009). 
The first section deals with background literature on poor understanding of 
mortgage terms and interest rates, and refinancing behaviour that suggests 
that the consumer predispositions that inhibit informed decision-making 
are not eradicated by buying a mortgage. The second section deals with 
complex mortgages that include features such as introductory rates or 
periods of interest-only repayments. How these mortgage features may 
cause consumer detriment by taking advantage of behavioural time 
preferences and cognitive constraints is discussed.  
Although this literature review aims to be global in scope, an early note of 
caution is required on synthesising mortgage evidence across countries. The 
prevalence of mortgage types differs remarkably across time and place 
(Campbell, 2012; Badarinza, 2015). This means that a well-informed, 
sophisticated consumer in one country may choose the same mortgage type 
as a vulnerable, uninformed one in another country. However, it is still 
possible to highlight some commonalities with regard to interactions 
between product features and consumer behaviour. 
Background Evidence: Complexity and Misunderstood Attributes 
The complexity of mortgage products can mean that it is difficult for 
consumers to notice or comprehend important attributes. One potential 
consequence is that comprehension may depend significantly on the type 
and quality of disclosure. Key properties of the mortgage can simply be 
missed. In the US at least, both experimental and survey data concur. In 
Lacko and Pappalardo’s (2010) experiment, a sample of 819 recent 
purchasers of a mortgage (half prime and half subprime) were given cost 
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disclosure forms for two hypothetical mortgage loans. Half received the 
federally mandated disclosure and half a prototype developed for the study. 
In the mandatory disclosure group, substantial minorities could not identify 
the interest rate or recognise that the loan included a large balloon 
payment. Half this group could not correctly identify the loan amount and 
two-thirds did not realise there was a penalty for refinancing. The number 
of questions answered correctly was significantly higher for the group given 
the prototype forms. Bucks and Pence (2008) compared responses from the 
US Survey of Consumer Finances to data provided by lenders. The results 
showed that a majority understood the basics of their mortgage, the type, 
term and annual payment, but were uncertain about details such as the 
frequency at which interest rates could change. Susceptibility to interest-
rate movements is an important aspect of a mortgage to understand, given 
the size and longevity of repayments. UK borrowers were asked in a national 
survey how they would cope financially with rate rises of 1, 2.5 and 5 
percentage points (FSA, 2004).  A substantial number of respondents stated 
that they would seek an alternative deal without seeming to realise that an 
interest-rate rise would apply to alternative lenders too.  
This lack of comprehension of important properties of the product may have 
knock-on effects for comparability. Evidence from data on brokered 
mortgages suggests that it feeds through to paying excessively for 
brokerage services (Woodward and Hall, 2012). Using telephone survey 
evidence, Lee and Hogarth (1999) found that at least 40 per cent of recent 
mortgage purchasers in the US did not understand that the advertised 
interest rate could be combined with fees to make a comparable APR. 
It is possible that first-time mortgage buyers acquire better knowledge once 
they purchase a mortgage, allowing them to improve on initial choices, but 
empirical evidence on refinancing behaviour is not encouraging. Estimates 
from multiple countries, such as Ireland (Devine et al., 2015), the US 
(Campbell, 2006) the UK (Miles, 2004) and Denmark (Andersen et al., 2015) 
suggest that substantial numbers of mortgage holders fail to refinance 
optimally. In the Danish study, for example, an empirical model of 
household inattention to mortgage refinancing incentives was estimated 
using an administrative dataset containing over 80,000 refinancing 
observations between 2010 and 2011. Optimal refinancing was rare. Those 
who did refinance optimally tended to be younger and better educated. Low 
uptake of preapproved, free refinancing offers targeted at suitable 
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households further suggests a lack of understanding of the financial benefits 
of refinancing (Keys, Pope and Pope, 2016). While it can be difficult to infer 
suboptimal refinancing, given the transaction costs involved in switching 
(Klemperer, 1987), including expected or actual time, psychological and 
financial costs, this study recorded that homeowners were missing out on 
very substantial savings even when conservatively estimating high 
transaction costs. 
Low Initial Repayments and Present Bias 
One salient feature of a mortgage is the initial monthly repayment. Evidence 
from multiple methods indicates that a substantial proportion of 
households may overweight the initial repayment when deciding on a 
mortgage. This may happen for reasons described in the previous 
subsection, because faced with such a complex product individuals do not 
know or understand that their interest rate is set to rise. Or it may happen 
because, even though individuals do know that the rate will rise, they are 
present-biased and so place much more weight on initial repayments than 
repayments in the future. If the lure attracts a sufficient proportion of 
consumers, providers may have an incentive to exploit these behaviours by 
marketing ‘teaser’ rates. 
Initial evidence comes from difficulties in accounting for the choice between 
adjustable and fixed-rate mortgages (ARM versus FRM). One theory 
proposes that households estimate future adjustable rates based on the 
average rate in the past (Koijen et al., 2009). Another argues that the key 
factor is the gap between the fixed and adjustable rates (Campbell and 
Cocco, 2003). However, a study using data from nine countries found only 
partial empirical evidence for these theories and concluded that mechanical 
forecasting rules do not describe how households form expectations about 
interest rates (Badarinza et al., 2015). Similarly, Miles (2004) calibrated the 
model of Campbell and Cocco (2003) to UK conditions and found large 
discrepancies between model predictions and chosen mortgage types. The 
factor that reconciled these differences was the degree of weight given to 
the initial monthly cost of the mortgage. When the model was adjusted so 
that more weight was given to the initial cost, its predictions more closely 
resembled observed market patterns. 
As outlined in Section 2, a product feature can be beneficial for one group 
of consumers and yet attract others for whom the product is unsuitable. A 
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mortgage with a low or zero introductory interest rate allows a home to be 
purchased at a much lower up-front cost, with the cost ‘back-loaded’ into 
the future. This can be useful for households engaging in initial outlay, such 
as for refurbishment, or for those who (correctly) anticipate rising income. 
Using UK household panel data, Cocco (2013) provides some evidence that 
consumers who expected income growth used mortgages with initial 
discounts as a tool for consumption smoothing; that is, as a way to keep 
their standard of living approximately constant. However, the paper also 
notes that the low initial monthly repayments may have attracted 
consumers who were more short-sighted and had no expected income 
growth. The finding that complex mortgages appeal to financially 
sophisticated consumers is also reported by Amronin et al. (2011). 
Multi-method empirical evidence implies that mortgages offering lower 
initial monthly repayments at the outset attract consumers for reasons 
other than consumption smoothing, because of both lack of knowledge and 
present bias. In the study cited above, Bucks and Pence (2008) found 
adjustable-rate mortgage holders were either unaware that their interest 
rates could rise or underestimated the possible change. Those at greater 
risk of large payment increases were more likely to report not knowing 
contract terms. The analysis linked lack of knowledge to poor financial 
literacy and cognitive constraints. 
Evidence also suggests that mortgage providers may not be overly keen to 
educate consumers about what happens when the introductory period 
ends. Gurun et al. (2016) conducted a large-scale empirical study on the 
relationship between spending on advertising by lenders and the mortgage 
prices offered by those same lenders. The databases used covered the 
majority of mortgage providers in the US and the vast majority of 
advertising literature. In a content analysis of 37,432 print and direct-mail 
mortgage campaigns, only seven (0.02 per cent) explicitly mentioned a reset 
rate – that is, the rate after the introductory rate expires.  This constitutes 
strong evidence that reset rates are hidden features of mortgage products. 
The study also showed that lenders who advertise more charge higher 
mortgage prices and that this correlation is stronger in areas with greater 
proportions of lower-income and less-educated borrowers.  
Further evidence that providers exploit the lure of low initial rates comes 
from Agarwal et al. (2017), who present and test a model of ‘shrouded’ 
Credit products 
 
 
31 
attributes inspired by Gabaix and Laibson (2006, see Section 1). The 
shrouded attribute in question is the reset rate on an ARM. While 
sophisticated consumers may purchase the mortgage in full knowledge of 
the looming interest-rate change and thus refinance before the 
introductory rate expires, less sophisticated borrowers may not, incurring 
the full brunt of the higher charges as a result. If there are enough less 
sophisticated borrowers, competition between providers will lead to 
greater differences between initial and reset ARM rates. Using data on 
mortgages provided by a large insurer, Agarwal et al. (2017) exploit the 
different timescales for the introduction of banking deregulation across US 
states to show that increases in competition drove down initial interest 
rates and drove up reset rates.  
Other evidence indicates a role for present bias as a driver of decisions 
distinct from lack of knowledge. In a survey of nearly 2,000 individuals in the 
UK, Gathergood and Weber (2017) recorded self-reported measures of 
impulsivity, patience and risk-aversion. Mortgage details, measures of 
credit constraints and income volatility were also obtained from the 632 
mortgage holders in the sample. Consumers with greater measured present 
bias were significantly more likely to hold back-loaded (i.e. interest-only) 
mortgages with low initial repayments. Consistent with the US studies, the 
data also recorded a link between financial literacy and back-loaded 
mortgages, such that a decrease of one point on a five-point financial 
literacy scale increased the likelihood of holding an interest-only mortgage 
by 53 per cent – an effect size of considerable magnitude. Atlas et al. (2017) 
found similar results in a US survey designed to disentangle the separate 
roles of discount rates and present bias as determinants of initial mortgage 
choice and subsequent mortgage management. A measure of impatience 
was added to a survey of a large nationally representative sample of US 
households. A follow-up Internet survey was administered to 244 
mortgaged US homeowners, of which 120 were in negative equity. 
Individuals with greater long-term discounting and present bias were more 
likely to choose back-loaded mortgages. Those with stronger present bias 
were also more likely to have borrowed a larger portion of the cost of their 
home and to be in negative equity. Interestingly, however, present-biased 
individuals were less likely to engage in strategic default, presumably 
because they placed greater weight on the immediate negative 
consequences of this course of action. 
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Lastly, in addition to the above survey evidence, Perry and Lee (2012) 
experimentally tested the role of decision fatigue in mortgage choice using 
a sample of US undergraduate business students. Decision fatigue was 
induced via an online shopping task in which one group was required to 
make 14 different choices about buying a house. Having completed this set 
of choices, they were asked to choose between five mortgage options. The 
control group completed only the mortgage-choice task. The mortgage 
options were designed so that the ARMs were higher-risk products but 
offered lower monthly payments. Decision-fatigued participants were 
significantly more likely to choose a high-risk ARM than the control group, 
who opted in greater numbers for the lower-risk FRM.  
Mortgages Summary 
The evidence reviewed above implies that two features of mortgages can 
be negatively linked to consumer decision-making. First, the complexity of 
the product means that key properties can be misunderstood or ignored by 
consumers, including rate changes and penalties. Second, low introductory 
interest rates can prove attractive to consumers who fail to understand the 
reality of the reset rate or who discount it because they are present-biased. 
The evidence is mostly survey-based, but also involves analysis of 
administrative data and some qualitative and experimental methods, with 
largely consistent findings. One striking element in Lacko and Pappalardo’s 
(2007) qualitative study is the detailing of interviewees’ moods, which 
visibly deteriorated as they realised more about the true nature of their 
contract terms. An avenue that perhaps requires further exploration is the 
possibility that consumers may be sufficiently fatigued by the process of 
house purchase that it has a negative effect on their ability to engage with 
the mortgage process in a deliberative manner. 
The evidence on time preferences and mortgage choice poses some 
challenges, because low introductory interest rates can be beneficial in 
theory if offered to consumers for whom they are suitable. In practice, 
however, they may be harmful. It is hard to see how marketing that makes 
salient an introductory interest rate while doing its best to shroud the reset 
rate can be anything other than harmful. One possibility would be more 
stringent suitability tests for any products with escalating rates, with the 
target market tightly defined based on expectations of future income.  
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4. RETAIL INVESTMENT PRODUCTS 
 
Retail investment mostly takes place through packaged investment 
products that give consumers easy access to financial markets. Underlying 
portfolios are generally decided for the investor and marketed in a branded 
and packaged form. There are many types of retail investment product and 
new types of offerings constantly emerge on the market. For simplicity, here 
we make the distinction between unstructured and structured investment 
products, where the latter depart from the model of simply paying returns 
on the underlying securities and instead pay returns according to a pre-
determined formula, often with some form of capital guarantee.  
4.1 NON-STRUCTURED INVESTMENT (MUTUAL) FUNDS 
Five Key Points 
• Retail investment consumers do not pay enough attention to fees. This 
might be because they are not salient enough or are expressed in a unit 
(such as percentages) that consumers find harder to process. 
• Natural experiments based on regulation change in India indicate that 
the level of fees firms charge decreases as fee transparency 
requirements increase. 
• Simplifying disclosures to make fees more salient had little effect on 
investment choices but experimental evidence shows that salient 
warnings and clear fund comparisons enable consumers to choose low-
fee funds. 
• Consumers overweight past performance information, especially when it 
is presented graphically. 
• Experienced investors consider past performance too, but not to the 
same extent as novice investors. 
Introduction 
Given the enormous variety and complexity of options for investors, even 
the most sophisticated consumers must rely on simplifying heuristics of 
some sort in order to choose an investment product. The main product 
features of non-structured investment funds are the portfolio make-up and 
the fees charged. Past performance of the fund is a common disclosure 
feature, too, that is often influential in decisions. Thus, one of the primary 
issues facing the retail investor is to balance their assessment of the fees 
charged by the provider against their evaluation of the quality of the 
underlying assets. These two elements of the choice are analysed 
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sequentially below, although in practice they often interact or are even in 
direct competition for a consumer’s attention.  
Background Research 
As with the products reviewed above, an initial snapshot of consumers’ 
knowledge and behaviour provides useful background. The proportion of 
households owning investment products has increased over recent 
generations in the US (Barber, Odean and Zheng, 2005) and Europe (Chater 
et al., 2010). The latter study involved a large-scale survey of 6,000 
consumers in eight EU countries and a set of experiments, conducted for 
the European Commission. The results showed that consumers engaged in 
very little product comparison, often simply trusting advice from a single 
financial institution, and that many held incorrect beliefs. Almost 40 per 
cent of consumers with investments wrongly believed that their initial 
investment was protected. The study reviewed evidence that fees in the 
market are dispersed and often hard to determine.  
Underweighting of Fees 
The academic evidence on mutual fund fees is unequivocal: to maximise 
returns, consumers should pay considerable attention to fee structures 
when making a fund selection (Gruber, 1996). However, only a minority of 
consumers have a good awareness of the fees they pay. Alexander, Jones, 
and Nigro (1998) found that less than 20 per cent of investors knew the fees 
and 84 per cent believed that higher fees were charged for better funds, 
when in fact the opposite is more likely to be the case. Evidence from 
multiple methods suggests that fees are underweighted by retail investors. 
One simple way to measure how fees are factored into decisions is via 
conjoint analysis studies, in which participants make multiple choices over 
different products. The weight given to different product attributes is then 
statistically modelled, without the need for rankings or ratings of funds 
(Huber, 1997). Using this method with a sample of mutual-fund investors 
who each made 20 choices between three mutual funds, Wilcox (2003) 
showed that consumers were simultaneously highly averse to once off up-
front fees and relatively indifferent to increases in annual management 
charges. Of the 50 participants, 46 displayed an inability to trade off these 
two fees in a reasonable manner over self-reported expected holding 
periods. 
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Barber et al. (2005) analysed historical US mutual-fund data and found that 
the mean operating expense ratio (the proportion of investment in a mutual 
fund that goes to the managing company) rose from just over 0.05 per cent 
in 1962 to almost 1 per cent in 2000. Simultaneously, the proportion of 
assets invested in upfront fees dropped from 91 per cent to 35 per cent. 
Based on a sample of 78,000 brokerage accounts, higher upfront fees were 
paid more by first-time investors, with repeat investors avoiding upfront 
fees but taking on higher back-loaded fees.  The clear suggestion is that 
upfront fees were salient for consumers and that much larger fees sliced off 
funds at the end of investment periods were less so.  
In Chater et al.’s (2010) experimental study, participants faced a relatively 
simple online investment experiment involving the allocation of €10,000 
between two investments. Returns were determined by simulation, and 
optimal choice was defined as putting all the money into the investment 
with the higher expected return, based on the assumption that participants 
ought to be risk-neutral over the small amounts of money that they could 
win. Results indicated that, when the optimal investment had fees 
described in percentage terms and the alternative had fees described in 
euros, optimal choice was less likely than when the opposite was the case. 
The authors suggest this may be due to ambiguity aversion; a failure to 
understand percentage fees. The experimental study went on to test strong 
simplification and standardisation treatments. These treatments 
significantly increased the percentage of funds allocated optimally in some 
tasks but not for others; as decision aids they were only of partial help. 
Anagol and Kim (2012) provide strong evidence for underweighting of fees 
from a natural experiment on financial regime change in India. A rule change 
in 2006 allowed fees to be taken off the value of closed-end funds over their 
tenure (technically called ‘amortization’). This reduced the transparency of 
fees substantially, as it was difficult for consumers to distinguish between 
changes in net asset value and changes due to fee deductions. The rule 
change led to a proliferation of new closed-end funds charging high fees. 
When amortization was banned in 2008, these funds almost disappeared 
from the market. During the 22-month period for which they were allowed, 
the paper estimates that consumers paid an additional 3 per cent in fees.  
Some studies have tested interventions designed to improve consumers’ 
responses to information about fees. Beshears et al. (2011) undertook a 
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portfolio allocation experiment with 186 Harvard non-faculty staff to test 
whether simplified descriptions improved decision-making. Participants 
made investment choices for two hypothetical $100,000 portfolios. Fees 
and average returns on fund options were varied so that some funds 
dominated others. A control group received standard prospectuses while 
other groups received simplified summary prospectuses, designed by the 
US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to present vital information 
more clearly and concisely. However, average portfolio fees and past 
returns were largely unaffected. Similar results are reported by Choi et al. 
(2010) in an experimental study that investigated the degree to which 
disclosure manipulations could improve consumer decision-making in 
indexed mutual-fund choice (technically a very simple structured 
investment product). Providing a simplified sheet that summarised fees or 
a simple description of what an indexed fund does (passively track the 
market) did not help consumers to choose funds with the best returns. 
A large-scale online experiment undertaken by the UK Financial Conduct 
Authority (FCA) with 1,049 participants investigated the impact of several 
interventions on how individuals factored fees into the decision over choice 
of fund (Hayes, Lee and Thakrar, 2018). In this study, participants selected a 
fund from a table of six options. This was repeated three times with 
different tables of options. The table gave the following information for 
each option: fund name (all were fictitious), the ongoing charge, the total 
costs and charges, past performance and risk level. A ‘More Info’ button 
could be clicked to give more information about that option. Unbeknownst 
to the participants, each group of six was made up of three pairs of funds. 
Within each pair one option had lower fees and the other had high fees (the 
size of the fee gap was varied). All other features, such as risk level and past 
performance, were held constant within pairs but varied between pairs.  
Four interventions were applied: 
1) Warning: A large-font visual warning reminding participants to check 
how much they were paying and that charges can have a significant 
impact on their returns 
2) Impact Chart: A graph showing how a small difference in charges made 
a relatively large difference to net returns over a 20-year period 
3) Comparator Chart: A scale showing whether a fund’s charges were 
lower, higher or about average compared to other similar funds 
4) Review Screen: A summary of the costs and charges for the selected 
fund, in addition to the comparator chart 
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There were five groups in total. One group saw none of the interventions 
(the control), one group saw only the warning, and groups three, four and 
five saw the warning along with the impact chart, comparator chart and 
review screen respectively. The key measure of the effectiveness of these 
interventions was how often participants chose a low-fee option in groups 
2-5 relative to the control group. The largest effect was for group 5, who 
saw the warning and the review screen. In this group, 81.5 per cent of 
choices were for a low-fee fund relative to 72.8 per cent for the control 
condition. This difference is highly significant. The other interventions also 
caused a significant increase in the proportion of low-fee funds chosen. 
However, only the warning and review-screen intervention led to increases 
in understanding,  as measured by a series of questions about the chosen 
fund’s characteristics after the choice task ended.  
Attention is a finite resource, and if the interventions directed attention 
towards fees at the expense of other attributes, it would not be surprising 
if choices were less sensitive to changes in those attributes. However, the 
results showed this was not the case; sensitivity to performance level of the 
funds was the same as in the control condition. Moreover, the warning 
interventions did not reduce the likelihood of participants saying they would 
be willing to invest in the chosen funds in real life. 
Overweighting Past Performance 
Academic research strongly suggests that the past performance of funds 
offers little if any predictive value for future performance (Brown and 
Goetzman, 1995; Carhart, 1997; Fama, 1970; Rhodes, 2000; Barber et al., 
2005). However, a number of well-established behavioural phenomena, on 
their own or in combination, might lead investors to overweight past 
performance, including extrapolation bias, representativeness and 
availability heuristics (Mitchell and Utkus, 2004), and anchoring on salient 
high or low points (Mussweiler and Schneller, 2003; Nelson, 2005). 
Empirical results from multiple methods converge on the central finding 
that consumers’ investment choices are indeed heavily influenced by past 
performance.  
In the context of retirement funds, Thaler and Benartzi (1999) conducted a 
laboratory experiment in which the time horizon of past performance was 
varied between one and 30 years. Participants who saw different periods 
made different investments. The authors put this effect down to the greater 
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volatility of performance over shorter periods. In the conjoint study of 
Wilcox (2003), of the six product features described – performance over the 
past year, average performance over the past 10 years, loading fee, annual 
management fee, beta measure (a proxy for volatility) and company name 
– greatest decision weight was placed on the two past performance metrics. 
Wilcox argues that his findings reveal “substantial cognitive errors” (p.658) 
and may arise because past performance is easier to understand than fee 
information. Similar findings arise in the experiment of Pontari et al. (2009). 
Participants (33 university staff and graduate students) ranked 18 mutual-
fund advertisements that varied in past performance, cost and brand name. 
Once optimal combinations of high performance and low cost had been 
selected, participants systematically selected high past performance over 
low cost.  
There is also evidence for the influence of past performance from field and 
survey experiments. Diacon and Hasseldine (2007) altered both the time 
horizon and format of past-performance information in a repeated 
measures mail field experiment. Perceptions of risk and return were altered 
by whether performance was depicted as an index of fund values or as 
quarter-on-quarter percentage yields, but this study did not report an effect 
of time horizon. In Kozup et al.’s (2008) Internet survey, past-performance 
information influenced judgments of perceived fund risk and expected 
returns only if presented graphically and only for those participants with 
lower financial knowledge. 
Experimental evidence in other domains provides further support for the 
view that past-performance information draws consumers’ attention. 
Husser and Wirth (2014) used an eye-tracking study to show that attention 
paid to past performance strongly influenced expected returns and 
purchasing intentions. A regulatory disclaimer warning against such 
extrapolation – “past performance does not guarantee future results” – was 
found to be ineffective in attenuating the bias.  
There is mixed evidence as to whether experience lessens the tendency for 
choices to be influenced by past performance. In the study of Barber et al. 
(2005), experienced investors did give less weight than novice investors to 
past performance. However, less encouraging are the findings of Koehler 
and Mercer (2009), who analysed 341 funds from 27 mutual-fund 
companies advertised in business magazines over a four-year period. 
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Companies selectively advertised their best-performing funds, but in an 
experimental test of responses to the adverts both retail investors and 
financial experts failed to appreciate this bias and treated them as 
representative of the provider’s overall performance.  
Non-structured Investment Funds Summary  
There is strong evidence, based on triangulation from multiple research 
methods, that two specific features of investment products are linked to 
disadvantageous consumer decisions. First, retail investors underweight 
fees, especially when back-loaded as a percentage taken from funds. 
Second, consumers overweight past performance.  
Also notable is that attempts to overcome these problems by 
experimentally testing simplified investor-information or consumer-advice 
interventions have met limited (Choi et al., 2009; Chater et al., 2010) or 
negligible (Beshears et al., 2010) success. There is some evidence that, 
where possible, recasting percentage fees as monetary amounts may 
increase the weight accorded to fees in decisions. Certainly, the evidence 
supports the argument that fees should be made not only more transparent 
but also more salient. If it is not feasible to prohibit past-performance 
information on the grounds that consumers demand it, there is an argument 
that it should at least be standardised to prevent manipulation of the time-
frame to exaggerate performance.  
4.2 STRUCTURED INVESTMENT PRODUCTS 
Five Key Points 
• Structured products require consumers to assess the likelihood of 
different levels of return of the underlying assets, which are then linked 
to different outcomes for the consumer according to the shape of the 
payoff function. 
• A common and seemingly attractive feature of structured products is the 
capital guarantee, i.e. protection against any nominal losses. 
• Empirical evidence suggests that returns from structured products are 
often poorer than the expected returns from the underlying assets. 
Structured products are overvalued in experimental settings and their 
level of risk is underestimated. 
• More complex structured products offer poorer returns to consumers. 
The appeal of these products may be caused by consumers focusing 
disproportionately on the salient low-probability best-case returns 
scenario, often denoted as the ‘headline rate’. 
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• Averaging attributes is a common strategy used in product evaluation, 
but is unsuitable for ‘barrier reverse convertible bonds’ where capital 
loss occurs if any product in the bundle falls below a threshold. 
Experimental studies show that, despite it being an unsuitable strategy, 
investors apply an attribute-averaging evaluation technique to these 
products and systematically underestimate the likelihood of capital loss 
as a result. 
Introduction 
Structured products are financial investments whose payoffs are defined as 
a more complex function of the returns on the underlying asset portfolio. 
They essentially offer retail investors easy access to derivatives. They are 
designed in theory to facilitate customised risk-return objectives, and 
therefore to benefit consumers whose needs cannot be met by traditional 
investment products. For instance, the returns of a structured product 
called ‘Fixeo’, issued by Credit Agricole, depended on the performance of 
the DJ EuroStoxx50 index (an index of Eurozone stocks) in the following way: 
After 1.5 years of investment, if the level of the index is at or above 
its initial level, then the product terminates on that date and offers 
a capital return of 112% at that time. At maturity, the product offers 
a capital return of 124%, as long as the final index level is at or above 
its initial level. Otherwise, the product offers a capital return of 
100%, as long as the final index level is at or above 60% of its initial 
level. In all other cases, the product offers a capital return of 100%, 
decreased by the fall in the index over the investment period. 
(Célérier and Vallée, 2017, p.2) 
 
Below we review evidence from multiple methods indicating that many 
consumers in the structured products market might be better off 
elsewhere. First, decisions are negatively affected by the probabilistic 
nature of outcomes defined over losses and gains, with disproportionate 
weight given to guaranteed (nominal) capital returns. Second, the 
complexity of structured products, as demonstrated by ‘Fixeo’ above, can 
lead to consumer detriment.  
Probabilistic Losses and Gains 
Although a great variety of structured retail investment products are now 
available in the market, one common feature is that they require consumers 
to assess the likelihood of different levels of return of the underlying assets, 
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which are then differentially linked to different outcomes for the consumer. 
Often, the function relating underlying returns to consumer outcomes 
differentiates between losses and gains. Since Kahneman and Tversky 
(1979), it had been understood that individuals misweight probabilities and 
respond differently to equivalent losses and gains. These preferences are 
embodied in Prospect Theory, a descriptive theory of how people make 
choices over uncertain outcomes. Two features of Prospect Theory 
particularly relevant to structured products are loss aversion and the 
certainty effect. Loss aversion means that people weight losses more 
heavily than equivalent gains. The certainty effect refers to the 
disproportionate preference for certainty relative to changes in probabilistic 
outcomes. In other words, a person would pay more to increase the 
probability of a positive outcome from 90 per cent to 100 per cent than they 
would to increase it from 80 per cent to 90 per cent. 
Loss aversion and probability misweighting are central to theoretical 
explanations for why structured products seem attractive to consumers 
(Das and Statman, 2013; Hens and Rieger, 2014; Vanderbrouke, 2015). The 
upshot of these analyses is that consumers will be drawn towards 
structured investment products that exploit these tendencies and yet result 
in lower investment returns.   
The exploitation of asymmetric responses to losses and gains is not that 
new. In a precursor to later work on structured products, Shefrin and 
Statman (1993) illustrated how firms leveraged biases to enhance the 
appeal of financial products, using the example of a covered call. The paper 
quotes from a stockbroker’s manual that emphasises how, when marketing 
covered calls2 to consumers, providers framed separate mental accounts for 
the gains from the call premium, dividend and capital gain, while casting 
what the consumer gave up in the exchange as vaguely as possible. This 
basic loss-gain asymmetry underpins one of the most common and 
seemingly attractive features of structured products, namely the protection 
against any (nominal) losses that comes with a capital guarantee.  
Field study evidence shows that, when participants were asked to design 
                                                        
2  A covered call is an options strategy where an investor holds a long position on an asset such as a stock (i.e. expects its 
value to go up) and at the same time sells a call option (a right to buy the asset at a predetermined price, called the 
strike price) on that same asset. This strategy allows investors to earn income via the premium received for writing the 
option. However, the investor forfeits stock gains if the price moves above the strike price. 
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their ideal structured product, capital-protected structured products were 
the most popular (Hens and Rieger, 2012). Several studies have also 
concluded that it is not possible to account for the popularity of certain 
structured products without assuming misweighting of probabilities or loss 
aversion. Breuer and Perst (2007) show how the prevalence of reverse 
convertible bonds is consistent with consumers possessing Prospect 
Theory-type preferences and low subjective competence. The analysis of 
Das and Statman (2013) suggests that the popularity of some structured 
products implies that a proportion of consumers evaluate losses and gains 
in separate mental accounts. 
Of course, it can be argued that for some consumers these preferences 
might make sense. Two key questions, therefore, are: first, whether 
structured products are sold only to suitable consumers and, second, 
whether consumers understand that, in return for offering a capital 
guarantee or another probabilistic benefit, the provider is likely to pocket a 
greater proportion of underlying asset returns in many circumstances. If 
evidence suggests that a type of structured product is systematically 
associated with substantial underperformance, then it would support the 
view that consumers’ preferences over probabilistic outcomes are being 
exploited.   
In this context, Chang, Tang and Zhang (2014) report that Hong Kong 
investors purchased 8 per cent more structured products when suitability 
checks were not carried out, with this effect being attenuated by higher 
financial literacy. Qualitative interviews revealed that some consumers 
misunderstood whether the notion of capital loss applied to the portfolio as 
a whole or its individual components. More generally, the empirical data 
suggest that consumers often fare badly by investing in structured products. 
In a detailed analysis of the pricing and expected returns of one popular 
structured equity product, Henderson and Pearson (2011) found that 
consumers locked in negative returns of at least 8 per cent per year – a 
figure arrived at by calculating the cost of instead holding the stocks and 
bonds underlying the structured products with the same risk. Using a larger 
sample of structured products, Bergstresser (2008) estimated a similar 
magnitude of overpricing. Entrop et al. (2016) analysed German retail 
investors’ performance using account-level data for 10,653 retail customers 
of a large German direct bank. The performance of structured products for 
retail investors was very poor. Relatively simple discount certificates 
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underperformed the market by 0.25 per cent per month; more complex 
‘bonus certificates’ underperformed by a very large 0.85 per cent per 
month. These measures of underperformance constitute large effect sizes. 
The FCA conducted an online survey experiment to investigate potential 
overvaluation of structured products with a sample of 384 retail investors 
who indicated they had bought or would consider buying structured 
products (Hunt, Stewart and Zaliauskas, 2015). Participants evaluated 
structured deposits with payoff functions that were linked to the 
performance of the FTSE100 and had a standard duration of five years. For 
instance, one structured deposit, called ‘capped’, offered a return 
equivalent to the growth in the FTSE100 up to a 30 per cent cap. The survey 
elicited expectations about both structured product and FTSE100 returns. 
The study hypothesised that, if consumers’ estimates of structured product 
returns were well calibrated, or if errors were random, projected returns 
would be a function of FTSE100 returns. If evaluations were systematically 
biased, however, the two estimated returns would not be aligned. 
Participants answered incentivised multiple-choice questions to gauge 
understanding of three structured products, and reported beliefs on likely 
returns over one, two and five-year horizons. Participants also compared 
the structured products to risk-free cash deposits. The results showed that, 
relative to their beliefs about FTSE100 returns, consumers overvalued 
structured products. Those with lower education attainment made greater 
overvaluations. With an average overvaluation of 1.87 per cent per annum 
overall, the effect size, again, was large. Moreover, the evidence on 
indifference points between risk-free cash deposits and structured products 
implied that the structured products were considered almost risk-free. 
Complexity 
With the possible exception of simple indexed funds, structured products 
are by their nature more complex forms of investment than unstructured 
products, since in essence they require returns on the underlying 
investment to be in some way translated into payoffs for the investor. 
Complexity is not straightforward to define or to manipulate 
experimentally, yet some studies suggest that it plays a role in consumers’ 
difficulties in evaluating structured products. 
Most straightforwardly, as described above, some empirical data record 
outcomes worsening as complexity increases (Entrop, 2016). In the 
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aforementioned FCA experiment, complexity was manipulated in the design 
by altering the number of components in the payoff function. The study 
recorded the highest overestimation for one of the more complex products, 
but did not report statistical tests between levels of complexity. 
Nevertheless, the authors conjecture that anchoring to the ‘headline rate’ 
might play a part. In other words, consumers may place disproportionate 
attention and decision weight on the best possible return the structured 
product offers, even if the probability of realising this return is very low. This 
possibility is consistent with the findings of Célérier and Vallée (2017), who 
obtained textual descriptions of the payoff formulas for 55,000 products 
issued in 16 European countries from 2002 to 2010, with a total estimated 
issuance value of €1.45 trillion. Using this rich dataset, textual analysis was 
used to explore correlations within the attributes of offered products, 
including the ‘headline’ rate, the complexity measured by the number of 
components in the payoff formula, and the level of risk measured by 
exposure to complete loss of principal. Results showed a positive correlation 
between headline rates and complexity, and that products with higher 
headline rates and greater levels of complexity and risk were more 
profitable to providers. Moreover, savings banks, which mainly target 
lower-income households, offered more complex products than 
commercial banks.  
One possible strategy that consumers might follow when faced with a 
complex structured product is to average the perceived risks of the multiple 
components, in line with evidence of attribute averaging in multiple 
domains (e.g. Weaver, Garcia and Schwarcz, 2012). This strategy would lead 
them in particular to overvalue structured products where performance 
was in some way contingent on the worst performing asset. Kunz, Messner 
and Wallmeier (2017) demonstrated that valuations of a specific structured 
product, ‘barrier reverse convertible bonds’, can be manipulated by 
exploiting this cognitive mechanism. Any capital loss for these products is 
dependent on the level of the worst-performing stock of a set, so by 
definition adding extra stocks to the set increases the downside risk. In an 
experimental study conducted with 244 active capital market investors in 
Switzerland, perceived risk of loss decreased substantially when safe stocks 
were added to riskier ones, suggesting that participants averaged the risks 
instead of totalling them. Half the participants in this experiment rated their 
expertise in evaluating structured financial products as strong or very 
strong.  
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Structured Investment Products Summary 
It is not straightforward to demonstrate that the demand for structured 
products is increased by mistaken valuations, since there are plausible 
consumer preferences that can explain the choice of a structured product 
with a poor expected return. Nonetheless, the evidence reviewed here 
suggests that the popularity of some structured products is driven by how 
they interact with the way that consumers process probabilities and gains 
versus losses. This conclusion is consistent with evidence showing that some 
structured products underperform other investments, sometimes by 
substantial amounts, and are systematically overvalued in experimental 
studies. There is some evidence that complexity results in consumers 
focusing disproportionately on low-probability headline returns and that 
they inappropriately average risks when they should total them. In general, 
provider mark-ups appear to increase with the complexity of the product. 
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5. INSURANCE 
 
Insurance allows risk-averse individuals to protect against financial loss. 
Almost any risk that can be quantified can be insured. Consequently, 
insurance is the broadest product covered in this review. Furthermore, the 
volume of work on risk perception, and how it is altered by context is very 
large. Jespersen (2016) provides a comprehensive review of drivers of 
insurance demand, while Schwarzc (2010) reviews evidence for mistakes in 
insurance decisions and discusses the difficulty of identifying consumer 
mistakes when, in part, they are paying for subjective ‘peace of mind’.  
To manage the breadth and volume of material, here we focus on two 
features of insurance where empirical studies highlight clear issues for the 
quality of consumer decision-making. We first review evidence for 
detrimental effects where insurance is offered as an add-on at the point of 
sale (POS), potentially inhibiting the use of deliberative reasoning. This is an 
area that has already received much regulatory attention: such insurance 
products have been the subject of regulatory penalties and consumer 
repayment schemes in the UK and Ireland. We then assess the degree to 
which the complex price structure of insurance, specifically the excess-
premium trade-off, plays a role in poor decisions for types of insurance such 
as health and motor insurance. 
5.1 ADD-ON INSURANCE  
Five Key Points 
• Emotional factors loom large in decisions to purchase add-on insurance. 
These factors are more prevalent than cognitive factors when the 
product is offered at POS. 
• Qualitative evidence on add-on insurance offered at POS suggests 
decision fatigue, pressure exerted by sellers and anchoring on the cost of 
the primary product (phone, car, etc) influence decision-making. 
• Empirical evidence suggests that overestimating the probability of 
product failure is another driver of demand for add-on insurance for 
consumer products. 
• Experimental evidence suggests that barriers to viewing alternative add-
on insurance products and time pressure both decrease the likelihood of 
choosing the cheapest option. 
• The claims ratio for add-on insurance is substantially lower than for other 
forms of insurance. 
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Introduction 
Several psychological factors have been linked to the decision specifically to 
purchase add-on insurance. First, experimental studies have found that 
emotional factors are key elements of the decision to insure. Huysentruyt 
and Read (2010) recorded that, while individuals overestimated car 
breakdown probability and associated repair costs, emotional benefits were 
the best predictor of willingness to pay for insurance. Similarly, in a 
questionnaire experiment, Ranyard and McHugh (2012a, 2012b) provided 
evidence that peace of mind drove purchase decisions for payment 
protection insurance (PPI) and that demand for PPI was consequently 
insensitive to the level of cover provided. Second, Rabin and Thaler (2001) 
argue that ‘myopic loss aversion’, a combination of loss aversion (Kahneman 
and Tversky, 1979) and mental accounting (Thaler, 1985), drives people to 
be risk-averse over small scales and thus to buy add-on insurance. Support 
comes from Jindal (2014), who found evidence of loss aversion being a 
primary factor behind decisions to pay high premiums for extended 
warranties when choosing between washing machines with repair costs and 
failure rates stated explicitly. Third, straightforward misperception about 
the probability of product failure may drive extended warranty demand. 
Using panel data from a large US consumer electronics retailer on extended 
warranty purchases between 1998 and 2004, Abito and Salant (2015) 
estimated that more than 80 per cent of the retailer’s profit on warranties 
was due to overweighting of insured products’ failure rates.  
Point-of-Sale (POS) Selling  
Each of these three psychological factors may be exacerbated when 
decisions are pushed onto consumers at the POS. Here we review evidence 
from multiple methods that supports the view that POS selling is an 
important situational factor that inhibits informed decision-making.  
The mark-up on payment protection insurance (PPI) is higher when it is sold 
alongside a primary product than when sold alone (Ashton and Hudson, 
2017). Following a ‘mis-selling’ scandal, the joint provision of unsecured 
lending and PPI was banned in the UK in 2009. In the context of this 
regulation, Ashton and Hudson (2014) analysed the lending offered by 
multiple banks over the period 1998—2011. The results showed a link 
between offering PPI and lower unsecured lending rates, implying a cross-
subsidy of sophisticated consumers by naïve ones who agreed to purchase 
PPI. Abito and Salant (2015) showed that the shopping environment 
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affected warranty purchases: the likelihood of buying a warranty was 
approximately 17 per cent higher in-store than online, controlling for 
household and brand fixed effects and some other relevant factors. This 
may imply that consumers are more prone to persuasion when shopping in 
person, possibly due to the influence of the salesperson who is able to raise 
a discussion about the possibility that something will go wrong. 
The FCA conducted an online experiment to investigate features of the add-
on insurance sales environment that reduce consumer surplus, including 
the POS feature (Iscenko et al., 2014). It consisted of an incentivised 
shopping task for primary product and associated optional insurance. 
Participants were a nationally representative sample of 1,504 UK residents. 
Five treatment groups were used  to isolate the effects of choice complexity, 
reduced transparency and the option to search for alternatives. The results 
suggested that small changes in how the product is sold could have 
significant impacts on consumer behaviour. In the condition where add-on 
insurance was revealed at POS, 65 per cent of insurance buyers purchased 
the first insurance offer they viewed without searching further. By contrast, 
only 17 per cent of participants did this when the insurance offers were 
presented alongside the primary product. Participants paid 15 per cent 
more for their add-on insurance when it was revealed at POS compared to 
the more transparent situation where it was presented up-front. Even 
modest search barriers (two mouse clicks in the experimental setting) led to 
reduced shopping around and paying higher prices for add-on insurance.   
A large scale, multi-method EU-commissioned study (London Economics, 
Ipsos and VVA Europe, 2017) conducted in six countries with 5,404 
participants included an examination of the potential detriment associated 
with POS add-on insurance offers. Focus groups reported feeling under 
pressure to make a decision, due to time or the techniques of sellers. An 
experimental test mimicked the time pressure that consumers experience. 
In the context of a car-rental or buying add-on insurance for a bed, 
participants were shown a brief description of the product and then an 
initial stage insurance offer. They had the choice to accept the offer, view 
alternatives or proceed without insurance. Participants in the group under 
time pressure were significantly more likely to accept the offer shown. The 
authors note that, in the group without time pressure, the proportion of 
medium and high-education participants who chose optimally was 
significantly higher than the proportion of low-education participants who 
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did so, but that no difference was recorded when time pressure was 
involved. The implication is that time pressure curtailed the ability to apply 
deliberative thinking. At the confirmation stage however, where time 
pressure was not applied, the group previously under time pressure were 
more likely to change their mind and proceed without insurance. The report 
stresses that the initial stage decisions may be most indicative of real-world 
behaviour, but notes that evidence of consumers rectifying mistakes 
suggests potential benefits to cooling-off periods.  
Qualitative research carried out by regulators supports the view that POS 
selling negatively affects consumers’ decisions. In a (US) Consumer Financial 
Protection Bureau (2016) report based on a sample of 308 recent car 
buyers, the majority of consumers reported buying add-on insurance during 
the process of arranging financing, with approximately half stating that the 
purchase was for peace of mind. Yet half also indicated they had not 
considered add-on insurance until they were at the dealer. Many also 
reported that they experienced decision fatigue. The Australian Securities 
and Investment Commission (ASIC, 2016) noted four detrimental effects of 
POS add-on insurance offers in the car market. First, consumers are more 
likely to be affected by decision fatigue (Pocheptsova, 2009). Second, the 
cost of insurance may be perceived relative to the price of the vehicle, 
making it seem cheaper than if considered in isolation. Third, having just 
agreed to purchase the car, the consumer’s emotional investment in the car 
is likely to be greater. Last, sales practices can leverage consumers’ sense of 
reciprocity, such as by pre-filling application forms on the consumer’s 
behalf. Similar themes are noticeable. Such evidence contained in 
qualitative reports must be weighed against sample size and researcher 
subjectivity, but a comprehensive empirical ASIC (2016) report of the level 
of sales, premiums, commissions and claims for add-on insurance products 
sold through car dealers provided corroborating quantitative evidence for 
the suggestion that car buyers’ decisions are negatively affected by how 
add-on insurance is sold. The claims ratio for add-on insurance was 9 per 
cent, substantially lower than the historic ratio for car and house insurance. 
Multiple causes for this low claims ratio were put forward, one being the 
environment in which the add-on insurance was sold. It is notable that a key 
factor in the UK regulatory decision (to ban PPI being sold alongside the 
primary credit product) was the extremely low claims ratio. 
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Add-On Insurance Summary 
Emotional and situational factors loom large in add-on insurance decisions. 
The evidence reviewed here suggests that these reduced the quality of 
consumer decision-making when a product was presented at POS. There is, 
therefore, an argument for policy designed to make the environment more 
conducive to informed decision-making. Given the situational factors, 
additional information may be less effective than rules, although 
information on historic failure rates might help to ‘debias’ consumers’ 
beliefs. The validity of trying to attenuate loss aversion in relation to 
extended warranties is more complex, since it depends on whether one 
views loss aversion as an emotional reaction, a mistake or a legitimate 
preference (Camerer, 2005). Reviewing much of the same literature 
contained herein, Baker and Siegelman (2013) propose a ban on the sale of 
extended warranties at the POS or, failing this, price regulation.   
5.2 EXCESS-PREMIUM TRADE-OFF 
Five Key Points 
• There is substantial empirical and experimental evidence that consumers 
prefer lower levels of excess than standard economic theory would 
predict. 
• Underestimating premium savings from a higher excess and 
overestimating the probability of a claim were some of the earlier 
theories forwarded to explain these preferences.  
• Recent empirical and experimental evidence indicates that the 
fundamental trade-off between premium and excess is poorly 
understood by many consumers. 
• Consumers often choose dominated options from menus of health 
insurance plans, offering clear evidence of a detrimental deficit in 
consumers’ understanding of the excess-premium trade-off. 
• Experimental evidence suggests simplification and clearly worked 
examples can improve consumer understanding of the excess-premium 
trade-off. 
Introduction 
The excess (‘deductible’ in the US) is the fixed amount that the insured party 
must pay before liability for the cost transfers to the insurer. The primary 
purpose of the excess is to minimise the risk of moral hazard on the part of 
the insured. From the insurer’s point of view, the ideal scenario is that the 
insured acts with the care and circumspection of an uninsured person. 
Theoretically, the behaviour of the insured approaches this ideal as the 
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excess increases in size. For this reason, a higher excess means a lower 
premium because the risk of a claim is lower, and so too is the total amount 
covered by the insurance. From a pure economic efficiency point of view, 
the optimal excess is often the highest that can be afforded. 
Overweighting Excess 
There is substantial empirical and experimental evidence that consumers 
prefer lower excesses than this standard economic theory would predict 
(Pashigan, 1966; Sydnor, 2010; Barseghyan et al., 2013). Numerous 
behavioural theories have been forwarded to explain this preference. For 
example, it may be due to insurance being viewed as an investment (Slovic, 
1977), the fear of feeling regret in case of a claim (Braun and Muermann, 
2004), or overestimating the probability of a claim. Experimental evidence 
suggests that individuals may also underestimate the possible premium 
savings of choosing a higher excess, because they insufficiently adjust the 
weight they give to the excess in their decision given the low probability of 
a claim (Shapira and Venezia, 2008). In other words, they do not account for 
the fact there is a low probability that out-of-pocket costs will be higher than 
the excess. If consumers frame the excess as a segregated loss, when faced 
with this loss they feel both the cost of the accumulated premiums and the 
out-of-pocket cost of the excess. Johnson et al. (1993) hypothesised that, if 
myopic loss aversion was a valid explanation for low excess preference, an 
equivalent rebate policy where the excess was paid to the insurance 
company as part of the premium and returned at year end in the event of 
no claim would appear more attractive than a standard excess policy. A 
between-subjects experimental test with 187 respondents showed that 
individuals were significantly more likely to rate the rebate policy as 
‘attractive’ than the equivalent excess policy.  
The aforementioned hypotheses assume that consumers understand and 
perform the trade-off between premium and excess, at least to a first 
approximation, although they may not do so in line with standard economic 
theory. However, a growing body of evidence suggests that the preference 
for low excesses may reflect lack of understanding of the fundamental 
structure of insurance. Schoemaker and Kunreuther (1979) carried out a 
hypothetical scenario experiment in which participants were told they had 
a 1 per cent chance of losing between $10,000 and $30,000. Four insurance 
plans, which differed in premium and excess, were offered to protect 
against this loss. Consumers ranked the attractiveness of each plan. Just 
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one-third of participants gave the ordering predicted by expected utility 
theory for risk-taking, risk-neutral or moderately risk-averse decision-
makers, leading the authors to note that the findings ‘raise questions about 
people's abilities to focus on two dimensions (premiums and deductibles) 
and appropriately weight trade-offs’. 
It is not clear, however, that based on such findings one can assert that 
consumers fundamentally misunderstand the premium-excess trade-off, 
because often there may be a set of perfectly reasonable but non-standard 
preferences that can rationalise a particular insurance choice as being the 
best for that individual. However, if consumers choose dominated options, 
we can more confidently deduce that a mistake is being made.  
Comprehension and Simplification 
Bhargava, Loewenstein and Sydnor (2017) present comprehensive empirical 
and corroborating experimental evidence that individuals choose 
dominated options in health insurance, implying a misunderstanding of the 
premium-excess trade-off. Given the strength of their findings, we give a 
more detailed description of the work. The study obtained access to data 
gathered at a large US firm, where employees constructed their own health 
plans from a build-your-own menu featuring 48 plans that varied in cost-
sharing and premium but were otherwise equivalent. Approximately 60 per 
cent chose a plan that was financially dominated. The average employee 
who opted into a dominated plan could have saved $372 per year by 
choosing an otherwise equivalent plan with a higher excess and lower 
premium. This is a large effect size, equivalent to 24 per cent of the 
premium. Two experiments explored reasons for the choices. The main 
hypotheses were: (a) menu complexity caused the choice of dominated 
options, (b) non-standard preferences and (c) ‘insurance incompetence’, 
meaning a basic lack of understanding of the cost-sharing features of 
insurance. The first online experiment with 2,379 participants suggested 
that menu complexity was of minor importance in the choice of dominated 
options, since even when only four plans differing only in excess and 
premium were displayed, two-thirds of participants still chose a dominated 
option. The second experiment with 605 participants investigated the effect 
of three interventions designed to explain the premium-excess relationship. 
Subjects were shown projected total health costs under scenarios of good 
health and bad health, a plain-language definition of excess, and a mapping 
of plan prices and excesses to total health costs. The intervention reduced 
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the proportion choosing dominated plans from 48 per cent to only 18 per 
cent.  
This study is important because it strongly suggests that the initial decision-
making recorded in a real-world setting did not reflect true preferences but 
instead revealed poor-quality decision-making by employees of a large 
company, who were unable to trade off a premium against an excess 
properly. It provides support for other studies in the health insurance 
sphere that report a basic lack of understanding on the part of consumers 
about the excess (Atanasov and Baker, 2014; Johnson et al, 2013). 
The EU-commissioned study (2017) on behavioural factors in insurance 
markets also probed participants’ understanding of an ‘excess’. On average, 
80 per cent could identify what the term meant. A survey question 
presented a table of key characteristics of three insurance policies, each 
including an excess. Respondents had to identify which policy they expected 
to have the lowest premium and the highest premium. The question on the 
lowest premium was answered more accurately (61 per cent average) than 
the question about highest premium (44 per cent average), but the results 
again indicated a lack of understanding of the interaction between excess 
and premium. The same study presented a choice task for either home 
contents or motor insurance, in which participants chose an excess level of 
either €0, €100 or €500. The excess level was defined as ‘correct’ if chosen 
to be as high as possible, given the respondent’s previously indicated 
personal financial situation, but 59 per cent chose an excess too low for their 
financial wealth. Although this evidence is arguably weaker than that of 
Bhargava et al. (2017) because a normative criterion was imposed not to 
pay more to insure against small losses, it provides further experimental 
evidence of mistaken choices of low excesses.  
Excess-Premium Trade-Off Summary 
Multiple studies imply that consumers do not appreciate that there is a 
trade-off between the excess and premium on an insurance contract. Given 
this, it is difficult to see how such consumers can make an informed decision 
on insurance plans. The findings of Bhargava et al. (2017) are telling in this 
respect, though they suggest that educational and advice interventions can 
help to improve decisions.  
The situation is further complicated by the fact that encouraging consumers 
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to take on higher excesses may be more appropriate for some types of 
insurance than others (Brot-Goldberg et al., 2017). 
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6. CONCLUSIONS 
6.1 SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
Credit Products 
Experimental and empirical evidence demonstrates that a large proportion 
of consumers do not understand the repayment dynamics of credit cards 
and are not aware of how to minimise the cost of debt across multiple cards 
with differing interest rates. Similarly, consumer responses to elements of 
disclosure strongly suggest a lack of understanding and consequential 
reliance on cues for appropriate behaviour. Convergent evidence from 
multiple methods indicates that minimum repayments on bills act as 
anchors, lowering repayments and hence increasing levels of debt and 
associated costs. By the same process, credit limits affect the behaviour of 
individuals that are not credit-constrained as they are treated as a signal 
about future earnings. Consumers often fail to factor in less salient product 
features, such as fees, into their decisions. This may be because they are not 
aware of them, pay insufficient attention to them, or are too optimistic 
about avoiding them. The regulatory restrictions on fees in the CARD Act 
have been of substantial benefit to consumers.   
Less research has been conducted on consumer decision-making in the 
domain of personal loans, but the extant literature points towards some 
similar predispositions to those documented in credit-card consumers. 
Consumers’ insensitivity to interest rates suggests a tendency to 
underweight attributes that are less well understood in decisions; for 
consumers of loans, APR is often not analogous to price. The multi-attribute 
nature of a loan may exceed cognitive capacity. Two strands of evidence 
support this view. First, in a large field experiment, superficial aspects of 
loan advertisements altered demand by the equivalent of one-quarter of 
the interest rate. Second, experimental evidence suggests consumer 
preferences over loans are highly malleable. Manipulating which co-
determined loan attributes are made explicit leads to widespread choice 
inconsistencies. For high-cost payday loans, presenting costs in cash terms 
increases the likelihood of choosing a lower-cost option. This accords with 
the view that interest rates are not well understood. 
Evidence draws a clear link between two aspects of mortgage product 
design and disadvantageous consumer decision-making. First, evidence 
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from multiple methods suggests that overall complexity of mortgage 
products means that key properties can be misunderstood or ignored by 
consumers, including rate changes and penalties. Qualitative and empirical 
evidence reviewed consistently indicated that the possibility and potential 
scale of interest-rate changes were systematically underestimated by many 
(mostly less educated) consumers of complex mortgages. 
Evidence from multiple methods implies that introductory offers on 
mortgages have the potential to cause consumer detriment. Experimental 
evidence also suggests that this salient mortgage feature may be more 
enticing when consumers are experiencing decision fatigue. The affordable 
initial monthly repayments attract present-biased consumers who do not 
necessarily consider the long-term repayment schedule after the reset rate. 
Advertising and empirical evidence indicates that these consumers are 
often specifically targeted by sellers of these mortgages. Present bias may 
also compound the consumer detriment if it reduces the likelihood of 
strategic default. However, consumer heterogeneity means that 
introductory interest rates should not be considered an undesirable product 
feature per se. Evidence suggests they can benefit sophisticated, income-
constrained households who wish to engage in consumption smoothing.  
Investment Products 
Triangulation from multiple research methods provides persuasive 
evidence that consumers underweight fees and overweight past 
performance in decisions on mutual fund investments. Experimental 
evidence indicates that past performance is often factored into decision-
making at the direct expense of fees information. Fees are underweighted 
to an even greater extent when they are back-loaded. Some evidence points 
towards recasting percentage fees as monetary amounts as a way to 
increase the weight accorded to fees in decisions. Experimental attempts to 
refocus consumer attention away from past performance towards fees 
through simplified investor information or consumer advice interventions 
have had limited success.  
The evidence that features of structured products negatively affect 
consumer decisions is less straightforward, but some general trends suggest 
that detriment is likely in many cases. Experimental and empirical evidence 
are in agreement that consumers overvalue structured products relative to 
the expected return of the underlying assets. Moreover, overvaluation 
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appears to be increasing in the complexity of the structured product, 
defined by the number of scenarios that influence the pay-off function. 
Focusing on one salient feature of a complex product, such as the low-
probability headline rate, is one strategy that plausibly could bring about 
the relationship between complexity and overvaluation that has been 
observed empirically.  
Moreover, qualitative evidence indicates that consumers misunderstand 
important features of structured products, such as the conditions under 
which a downside barrier is breached. Inappropriate attribute-averaging 
strategies indicate the possibility of fundamental misunderstandings that 
have the potential to cause considerable unexpected consumer detriment. 
The extent to which market forces should be allowed to cater to costly 
preferences on the part of consumers is arguable. Ensuring that consumers 
are aware of these costs seems a reasonable prerequisite. To this end, 
appropriately designed suitability tests may play an important role in the 
market for structured products. 
However, given the inherent complexity of structured products and the 
scale of consumers’ overestimation of their value, as demonstrated by some 
of the effect sizes reported above, there is an argument for stronger 
intervention. One possibility is to insist that structured products and their 
surrounding disclosures be empirically tested, to ensure that consumers are 
able to value them, or as a guide to establishing their suitability. We return 
to this possibility in the final section of the paper.   
Insurance 
Qualitative, empirical and experimental evidence suggests that the practice 
of offering add-on insurance at POS has a detrimental impact on 
deliberation by consumers, a hallmark of informed decision-making. 
Multiple factors are posited to play a role in the negative impact of POS 
selling on decision-making, including: viewing prices relative to the cost of 
the primary product, decision fatigue, a sense of reciprocity to the 
salesperson, and an increased emotional investment in the primary 
product. Measures to limit the impact of these factors in decisions may be 
beneficial to consumers.  
Evidence also suggests that consumer decision-making on insurance plans 
is afflicted by a misunderstanding of the excess-premium trade-off. The 
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complex fundamental structure is a barrier to informed decision-making.  
6.2 POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
Much of the material reviewed in this international literature review is 
recent and the volume of relevant evidence being generated continues to 
grow. Behavioural economists are taking advantage of improved data 
gathering and availability, and devising multiple methods of empirical study 
for testing behavioural hypotheses. Given this backdrop, it is a matter of 
judgment as to whether one considers the volume of evidence described 
here, linking these features of financial products to the quality of 
consumers’ decision-making, to be high or low. Nevertheless, one of the 
striking aspects of this review, as the preceding summary makes clear, is 
that in each of the main product categories covered there are identifiable 
features of products that raise concerns from a consumer protection 
perspective.  
If a generalisation is permitted across the body of evidence as a whole, it 
seems reasonable to conclude that as we learn more about how real 
consumers make decisions in retail financial services markets, the evidence 
does not support the traditional model of self-interested utility-maximising 
consumers. Mistakes are common and the quality of decision-making with 
respect to multiple product categories is questionable and in some cases 
quite poor. Across multiple studies, the findings also suggest that, although 
a substantial proportion of the population may be influenced by certain 
product features in a negative manner, effect sizes tend to be larger with 
respect to individuals with lower levels of education and financial 
understanding. However, in many cases interventions designed to 
communicate key pieces of information and to promote informed decision-
making had no or only modest impacts. Put simply, the consumer’s problem 
is rarely one of lack of information. Other solutions are required. 
One theme to emerge across multiple markets is that there are products for 
which there may be too many important attributes for consumers to take 
them all into account simultaneously. For instance, the impact on decisions 
of changing which specific attributes of personal loans are made explicit, the 
gains from reducing the number of potential fees incurred on credit cards, 
the failure to understand or recognise mortgage reset rates, and the 
difficulty of combining multiple risks associated with a structured 
investment product, all suggest that consumers’ cognitive capacity is taxed 
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by products with large numbers of important attributes. This leaves them 
potentially prey to product features that emphasise some attributes and 
shroud others. These findings, therefore, add weight to the argument that 
policymakers might assist consumers by mandating the provision of at least 
some products for which the attributes all meet a certain standard, whether 
branded as ‘plain vanilla’ or otherwise (Barr, Mullainathan and Shafir, 2008; 
AFM, 2015).   
Two other commonalities of the findings reviewed imply that specific types 
of disclosures may be particularly helpful. First, consumers seem to factor 
monetary amounts into their decision-making more easily than 
percentages, such as where weight is given to monetary costs rather than 
the APR on credit products, and upfront fees are avoided at the expense of 
larger back-loaded fees taken as percentages from investment funds. At one 
level, the fact that consumers do not treat different descriptions of amounts 
as equivalent is troubling. However, knowing that cash amounts carry more 
weight in decisions is important for considering how to design effective 
disclosures and how to communicate good consumer advice. Second, the 
review uncovered multiple examples where consumers did not comprehend 
the fundamental basis of the transaction in which they were engaged. That 
is, while they may have been able to see the potential benefit of the product 
to them, they seemed not to grasp or pay sufficient attention to how the 
provider was making its profit, whether by underestimating accumulated 
costs of credit or fees, or more simply by failing to negotiate the trade-off 
between premium and excess. Arguably, it is a fundamental aspect of 
judging the merits of any transaction to know where the transaction surplus 
ends up. 
The fact that multiple experimental methods are now being exploited to 
investigate the quality of financial decision-making has its own potential 
implication. As research methods become more standardised and the skills 
to conduct decision-making research more widespread, it is reasonable to 
ask why these methods are applied to investigate potential problems 
associated with financial products that are already on the market. 
Increasingly, there must be an argument for employing these research 
methods before financial products come to the market. It is now relatively 
straightforward to test consumers’ comprehension and decision-making 
with respect to different products and disclosures. Given the evidence 
reviewed here, the pre-testing of some products and product features 
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would be likely to highlight important issues for consumer welfare, such that 
we could be more confident that innovative financial products offer genuine 
value to the consumer.    
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